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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of two studies on System Justification Theory, hereafter SJT. SJT
(Jost and Banaji 1994) is a psychology theory stating that individuals justify the status quo even if
doing so is against their own or their group’s interest (Jost et al. 2004). Comprised of twenty
propositions, SJT attempts to explain social and psychological factors driving individuals to
perceive the social system as legitimate. These factors also drive individuals to support and
maintain the social system. The synthesis and application of this psychological theory in
behavioral accounting research is limited, but could provide explanatory evidence on individual
decision-making in accounting.
The first study of this dissertation synthesizes SJT’s four foundational theories – cognitive
dissonance, social identity, social dominance, and belief in a just world – in behavioral accounting
research, specifically focusing on two predominantly used theoretical motivations, cognitive
dissonance and social identity theory. Behavioral accounting and corporate social responsibility
(CSR) have increasingly become more complex as interest in these two areas continues to grow.
The first study reviews prior behavioral accounting research that applied cognitive dissonance or
social identity theory, and then demonstrates how the application of SJT in behavioral accounting
research addresses more complex research questions that cannot be addressed solely from one or
a combination of SJT’s four foundational theories.
The second study then applies SJT’s theoretical motivations in a complex managerial
accounting setting by investigating whether maintaining the status quo is a factor explaining
managers’ decisions to overstate environmental capital expenditure (ECE) projections. This study
uses an experimental design to understand whether the presence of an overstatement status quo
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and a system threat affects managers’ decisions to overstate environmental projections. The results
indicate that managers are more likely to overstate ECE projections when the industry exhibits an
overstatement status quo. Additionally, this propensity to overstate ECE projections is further
exacerbated when managers face a stakeholder threat, suggesting they “dig in their heels” and
maintain the status quo. This study extends environmental accounting research by demonstrating
that the societal status quo affects managers cognitively and psychologically as they make
environmental disclosure decisions. Results also contribute to practice by shedding insight as to
why managers make certain environmental disclosure decisions. Specifically, the results show that
the social system impacts managers’ willingness to use environmental disclosures as a legitimating
tool.
Overall these two studies contribute to behavioral accounting research by exploring and
applying a psychological theory in a managerial environmental accounting setting. It demonstrates
how a commonly used psychology theory that has never been utilized in accounting research could
address broad and complex accounting topics.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Behavioral accounting research is increasingly becoming complex, spanning all accounting
disciplines including managerial accounting and corporate social responsibility (CSR) research
(Chen et al. 2014; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2012; Michelon et al. 2018). However, prior
behavioral accounting research predominately uses rather narrow and discrete theories. The
utilization of these more narrow theories might not be sufficient in addressing emerging complex
accounting topics. System justification theory (SJT) is a broad psychology theory stating that
individuals support and maintain the current social system even if doing so is against their personal
or group interest (Jost and Banaji 1994). Grounded in cognitive dissonance, social identity theory,
social dominance, and belief in a just world, SJT can address these emerging complex behavioral
accounting research questions and provide a more thorough understanding of behavioral
accounting and CSR research that could not be achieved using more narrow theoretical
perspectives.
Relatedly, one complex managerial accounting study finds that managers consistently
overstate their companies’ future environmental spending projections (Patten 2005). Actual
spending on these environmental projects is lower than projected in 76.1 percent of the cases
examined (Patten 2005). Although this issue has been explored through archival means (also see
Chen, Chen, and Patten 2014), behavioral research has yet to explore why managers overstate
environmental projections. Given the complexity of this managerial behavioral accounting topic,
it is essential to consider broad psychology, sociology, or cognitive theories that could provide
new insight and understanding behind managers’ decision-making. One such theory, SJT, could
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provide insight regarding managers’ decision-making by exploring the impact of the social system
and threats to the social system.
The overall purpose of this dissertation is two-fold: 1. Review SJT’s foundational theories
and the application of these foundational theories and SJT in prior behavioral accounting research,
and 2. Apply SJT’s theoretical motivations to a complex managerial and environmental accounting
topic. This dissertation is timely as prior behavioral accounting research consistently utilizes
similar theoretical motivations to understand broad and complex accounting topics. The first study
of this dissertation expands knowledge of prior behavioral accounting research’s application of the
cognitive and social theories that build SJT. The first study demonstrates how SJT can be address
both similar and more complicated accounting research questions that could not occur through one
or combination of SJT’s foundational theories. The second study of this dissertation applies SJT
to address a complex managerial and corporate social responsibility topic. Specifically, SJT is used
to understand better why managers continue to overstate future environmental projections. The
second study of this dissertation provides insight regarding managers’ psychological motivations
for overstating environmental projections.

Study One: Motivating and Explaining Behavioral Accounting and Corporate Social
Responsibility Research through System Justification Theory
Behavioral accounting research and, specifically, corporate social responsibility (CSR)
have increasingly become complex, spanning a wide range of research questions that have never
been explored in prior research (Chen et al. 2014; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2012; Michelon
et al. 2018). Although the complexity of these research questions continues to grow, behavioral
accounting research consistently relies on a somewhat predictable, and limited, set of theoretical
lenses. The utilization of these consistently-used theoretical perspectives are no longer sufficient
2

because they tend to provide a single, narrow perspective, potentially limiting generalizability to
recent, multi-dimensional, and broad accounting areas.
The first study explores System Justification Theory (SJT), grounded in cognitive
dissonance (Festinger 1957), social identity theory (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1979), social
dominance (Sidanius and Pratto 1999), and belief in a just world (Lerner 1980), and how its
application can provide new insight into behavioral accounting and CSR research. This study
achieves this objective by reviewing how prior extant behavioral accounting research applies the
more narrow set of theoretical perspectives, cognitive dissonance, social identity, social
dominance, and belief in a just world, to address complex research questions and whether SJT
provides a more thorough understanding of these same research questions and topics.
SJT (Jost and Banaji 1994) states that individuals often make irrational decisions by
supporting the social system even if doing so does not align with their personal or group interest.
These decisions are guided by individuals’ beliefs, attitudes, and thought processes, referred to as
ideologies (Jost 1995, 2001). These ideologies arise from a single or a combination of the
following foundational theories: cognitive dissonance, social identity, social dominance, and belief
in a just world. However, SJT’s twenty theoretical propositions can move beyond the four theories
discussed. Cognitive dissonance theory argues that individuals’ decisions are impacted by whether
they feel personally responsible for the outcome of those decisions. Relative to cognitive
dissonance, SJT argues that individuals’ decisions are impacted by the status quo, regardless if
they feel responsible for the outcome of their decisions. These decisions are made unconsciously
and individuals at times might not understand the impact of those decisions. Thus, SJT provides a
larger and more holistic theoretical perspective that can potentially address emerging complex
behavioral accounting research questions.
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The first study in this dissertation provides an extensive review of prior behavioral
accounting research, specifically focusing on two predominately used theories in behavioral
accounting research, cognitive dissonance and social identity theory. The review encompasses a
manual review of behavioral accounting journals- Accounting, Auditing, and Accountability
Journal. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Contemporary Accounting Research, Journal of
Accounting Research, Journal of Business Ethics, and The Accounting Review, spanning the last
thirty years. This study then discusses the limited application of one of SJT’s facets, status quo, in
behavioral accounting research, and shows that SJT can address a broader range of behavioral
accounting and CSR research questions that cannot be accomplished through the utilization of one
or a combination of the four previously discussed foundational theories. The overall review
demonstrates the significant need to apply broader psychology theories, such as SJT, that provide
new insight into examining complex behavioral accounting and CSR research questions.

Study Two: The Psychological Influences Driving Management’s Disclosure of Overstated
Environmental Projections
Public companies in sensitive industries that impact the environment tend to have
significantly large and ongoing environmental capital expenditures (ECE) to comply with
environmental regulations (Blanc et al. 2017). Although there is an increase in the amount of
companies disclosing their current ECE, Patten (2005) finds that managers overstate ECE
projections relative to actual spending in the following year. Thus, Patten (2005) argues that
managers’ ECE projections are misleading because they are overstated relative to actual spending
in the following year in more than 75 percent of the cases examined.
There are several potential explanations that could provide insight regarding managers’
ECE overstatement projections. One such explanation is that managers overstate ECE projections
4

to increase their company’s environmental legitimacy with external users (Chen et al. 2014).
However, given that managers continuously overstate ECE projections over time, there might be
other psychological or social factors that affect their decision to overstate.
This study uses systems justification theory (SJT) to examine whether managers’
propensity to overstate ECE projections in the short-term can be explained by the effects of the
social system. SJT is a psychological theory that states that individuals maintain and support the
status quo even if doing so is not in their interest (Jost and Banaji 1994; Jost and Hunyady 2005).
According to SJT, a social system (i.e., status quo) represents any commonly accepted practices,
policies, or industry norms legitimized by individuals’ conformity and acceptance of them (Haines
and Jost, 2000; Jost 1995; Jost and Hunyady 2002). Managers aware of a social system where
companies within their industry are overstating ECE projections (i.e., overstatement status quo)
might be more inclined to behave similarly and overstate their company’s ECE projections. This
study further explores whether this overstatement status quo impacts managers’ belief that
supporting the status quo, through an increase in ECE projection overstatement, is explained by
their belief that doing so is in their CEO’s and their own interest. SJT suggests that managers might
make decisions based on information that is most consistent and agreed upon between multiple
parties, even if doing so is not in their own economic self-interest (Henry and Saul 2006; Jost
1995; Jost et al. 2004, 2003b).
This study then analyzes within the status quo condition whether the presence of an
external threat affects managers’ perceptions of the CEO’s pressure to improve the company’s
environmental image as an important factor in their ECE projections and believe doing so is in
their best interest. A system threat represents any change to the current status quo (Wakslak et al.
2011), including stakeholder dissatisfaction. SJT suggests that managers are more likely to
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overstate in the presence of a system threat by “digging in their heels”, perceiving the CEO
pressure to overstate as an important factor in their ECE projection decision, and further believing
doing so is in their best interest.
This study uses two 1x2 experiments with one overlapping cell to test these expectations.
The study manipulates an overstatement status quo (present vs. absent) and system threat (high vs.
low system threat) between-participants. In the present (absent) overstatement status quo
condition, participants received information that all (half) of their competitors’ are overstating
their ECE projections relative to actual ECE spending. In the high (low) system threat, participants
received a news article indicating that the public is disappointed with (indifferent to) many
companies’ environmental activities. This ultimately resulted in three main conditions: absent
status quo/low system threat, present status quo/low system threat, and present status quo/high
system threat. Participants were randomly placed in these conditions and received information
about the following: the case company’s and industry companies’ prior year ECE projections and
actual spending, the CEO’s recommendation, and that their annual performance evaluation will be
assessed based on the accuracy of the ECE projection relative to actual spending. Participants then
made ECE projections.
The results show that managers overstate ECE projections more in the presence of an
overstatement status quo relative to an absent status quo, explained by managers’ beliefs that doing
so is in their best interest. Additionally, managers in the present overstatement status quo condition
are more likely to overstate ECE projections when there is a high as opposed to low system threat.
Mediation analysis further explains that managers believe their CEO’s pressure to improve the
company’s environmental legitimacy was an important factor in their ECE projection and
overstating ECE projections is in their CEO’s and their own best interest.
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Overall Contribution
The complexity in behavioral accounting and CSR research continues to grow, but the
utilization and application of broad, generalizable, and relevant theoretical perspectives remain
limited. Additionally, one emerging managerial CSR accounting research question necessitates the
utilization of behavioral methods and application of such relevant theoretical perspectives. This
managerial CSR accounting topic attempts to understand why managers consistently overstate
environmental capital expenditure (ECE) projections, on average, relative to actual ECE spending
in the following year.
The first study contributes to behavioral accounting and CSR research by reviewing prior
behavioral accounting research, specifically where cognitive dissonance or social identity theory
were utilized, and demonstrates the need to explore more broad and generalizable theories. These
two more discrete theoretical perspectives, in addition to social dominance and belief in a just
world, play a role in developing system justification theory (SJT), a broad psychological theory.
Through the review, study one contributes to behavioral accounting and CSR research by
demonstrating how prior research utilizes more narrow theoretical perspectives and how SJT could
address pertinent emerging complex behavioral accounting research questions that cannot be
addressed through the usage of one or more of SJT’s foundational narrow theories.
The second study contributes specifically to managerial accounting and CSR research
because it advances the understanding and application of SJT’s two facets – status quo and system
threat - in a complex behavioral accounting setting. It provides insight regarding the effect of a
social system and a threat to that social system on managers’ environmental disclosure decisions.
This study’s results are relevant not only to managerial and CSR research but to external users as
managers might be willing to use such disclosures as a legitimating tool.
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STUDY ONE: MOTIVATING AND EXPLAINING BEHAVIORAL
ACCOUNTING AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
RESEARCH THROUGH SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION THEORY
Introduction
Accounting research is becoming increasingly more complex as researchers expand work
into additional corporate social responsibility (CSR) topics (Chen et al. 2014; Dhaliwal et al.
2011; Kim et al. 2012; Michelon et al. 2018). Recent mainstream CSR accounting research
focuses predominantly on the relationship between CSR and financial factors such as analyst
forecast accuracy (Dhaliwal et al. 2012), earnings quality (Kim et al. 2012), and cost of equity
(Dhaliwal et al. 2011) 1. However, other recent CSR accounting research also explores nonfinancial factors relating to tax behavior (Hoi et al. 2013; Sikka 2010), assurance and credibility
(Cohen and Simnett 2015; Pflugrath et al. 2011), and reporting and disclosure (Bouten et al.
2011; Mahoney et al. 2013). Although the majority of CSR accounting studies employ archival
research methods, behavioral methods are being encouraged (Alewine 2010; Moser and Martin
2012) and gaining traction in mainstream accounting literature (e.g. Pflugrath et al. 2011). This
relatively new CSR behavioral accounting research landscape has, to date, relied on a somewhat
predictable, and limited, set of theoretical lenses.
As accounting becomes more complex, these consistently-used theories are no longer
sufficient because they tend to focus on a single, usually narrow, perspective. This narrow view
limits the generalizability of the theoretical perspective into recent, complex, and relevant
accounting areas. System Justification Theory (SJT), grounded in cognitive dissonance, social
identity, social dominance, and belief in a just world, can provide behavioral accounting research

1

These examples are not exhaustive.
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new theoretical insights because its integrative perspective is better suited to help understand
complex accounting practices. The current study aims to illustrate how SJT can provide further
and new insight into behavioral accounting and CSR research by examining how extant
accounting research applies cognitive dissonance, social identity, social dominance, and belief in
a just world, and whether SJT provides a more thorough understanding of those same topics.
SJT can have significant applications to behavioral accounting research because it is a
broad, complex psychological theory, arguing that individuals often make irrational and, at
times, unconscious decisions that do not align with their own self-interest (Jost and Banaji 1994).
These decisions are not attributed to a specific bias, but to a collection of biases that form SJT.
According to Jost (2001), research in organizational behavior, psychology, sociology, and
political science concludes that individuals’ beliefs, attitudes, and thought processes produce and
maintain social systems (i.e., the status quo) that induce these irrational behaviors. In this study,
these beliefs, attitudes, and conscious and unconscious thought processes are referred to
collectively as ideologies. Thus, individuals’ ideologies play a major role in determining which
aspects of a social system they accept as the status quo 2 (Jost 1995, 2001).
SJT states that individuals will justify the status quo in order to maintain the legitimacy
of the system in which they live, even if this produces unjust personal outcomes. Authorities,
standards, and procedures are most frequently viewed as legitimate and perceived to form the
status quo, which in turn, dictates how members in society should behave (Jost 2001).
Individuals’ ideologies also can dictate why individuals engage in justifying the status quo,
commonly referred to as system justification behaviors. System justification behaviors are

2

This body of literature does not specifically address and define the status quo. Rather, it is simply any social
component (i.e. social arrangements/system) that becomes accepted as the norm.
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explained through several theories including cognitive dissonance, social identity, social
dominance, and belief in a just world; thus each of these theories support the broader construct
labeled SJT. Cognitive dissonance theory, social identity theory, social dominance, and belief in
a just world also can potentially affect individuals’ attitudes, thoughts, and beliefs. SJT purports
twenty propositions regarding individuals’ behavior (Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004), however,
there is limited research that applies this theoretical perspective to behavioral accounting.
SJT can utilize its twenty propositions to address relevant complex behavioral accounting
research questions. For example, why do managers repeatedly disclose inaccurate CSR
information? According to SJT, managers might be disclosing inaccurate CSR information
because it represents the current normative practice followed by its company and its competitors.
In comparison, the usage of cognitive dissonance would suggest that managers are disclosing
inaccurate CSR information in order to reduce their own personal guilt and potentially improve
their own self-image. SJT offers extensive explanations that might be similar or diverge from the
commonly used behavioral accounting theories of cognitive dissonance, social identity, social
dominance, or belief in a just world.
While SJT holds promise as a foundation theory in behavioral accounting research, its
complexity compels an articulation of the theory and its relation to more narrow theories before a
proper assessment of its potential contribution can be assessed. SJT’s propositions are influenced
by either one or a combination of the four theories of cognitive dissonance, social identity, social
dominance, and belief in a just world 3. Although SJT has been motivated by these more discrete

3

Jost et al. 2004 examine SJT’s propositions in detail, but the current study does not specifically review SJT’s
propositions and how each of the four foundational theories build on each of the propositions. Rather, this study
reviews prior behavioral accounting research and then applies SJT’s propositions to address complex accounting
topics.
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theories, it diverges from them on several accounts. Namely, SJT can maintain similar
assumptions about individuals’ beliefs, attitudes, and thoughts (ideologies) but can apply it
towards a system justification context. For example, social dominance refers to group based
hierarchies, but SJT utilizes this assumption to state that, in addition to individuals, all groups,
regardless of their hierarchy, will support the current status quo. Thus, SJT states an opposite
theoretical assumption than is assumed under the other four theories.
In analyzing the corporate CSR environment, this study argues that indeed SJT can
address a broader range of behavioral accounting research questions that cannot be achieved
under the application of only one of the theories. For example, cognitive dissonance predicts that
individuals who feel personal responsibility for their organization’s activities will rationalize
their organization’s unethical and environmentally unsafe processes to reduce their own guilt.
Comparatively, SJT predicts that individuals do not have to feel responsible for the
organization’s activities to rationalize the organization’s unethical and environmentally unsafe
processes. SJT’s wide span of assumptions allow researchers to address behavioral accounting
questions such as sustainability disclosure reporting, environmental expenditures, and executive
decisions regarding environmental projects.
Given the scope of cognitive dissonance, social identity, social dominance, and belief in a
just world, this review focuses on specific behavioral accounting studies that highlight the
significant need to apply SJT. In addition, given that the purpose of this study is to illustrate
SJT’s potential to facilitate the examination of accounting and CSR topics, significant detail and
consideration is devoted to SJT’s underlying logic and application into behavioral accounting
research. This process results in a thorough understanding of each of the theories’ prior
application in accounting, and how SJT comparatively addresses current complex accounting and
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CSR research questions that its four supporting and potentially competing theories are unable to
address.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The second section focuses on
behavioral accounting research that has applied any of SJT’s four foundational theories,
including cognitive dissonance theory, social identity theory, social dominance theory, and belief
in a just world. It also investigates how these four theories have been applied in a CSR setting,
where applicable. The third section then discusses the foundation of SJT and how its application
into behavioral and CSR accounting research can address more holistic and complex research
questions, providing superior insight into individual decision-making.

Accounting Research using SJT’s Foundational Theories
This section of the study examines the following four theories that Jost and Hunyady (2005)
utilize to support SJT: cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957), social identity theory (Tajfel 1981;
Tajfel and Turner 1979), social dominance theory (Sidanius and Pratto 1999), and belief in a just
world (Lerner 1980). Although SJT uses these four theories, SJT’s propositions are not always
completely consistent with the propositions underlying the other four theories 4. Identifying how
SJT selectively incorporates these individual theories allows a richer understanding of the
potential social and economic consequences resulting from individuals’ susceptibility of
engaging in system justification thinking. 5 Thus, it is necessary to first discuss each individual

4

Jost et al. 2004 facilitate an understanding of SJT’s theory and briefly discusses some of the theoretical motivations
underlying SJT’s propositions. For a more thorough understanding of the specific differences between SJT and the
other four foundational theories, please refer to Olczak (2019).
5
It is relevant to note that SJT can also be compared and contrasted to ego and group justification as well as other
theories such as false consciousness. Ego and group justification are recognized as contradictory justification
tendencies of SJT (Jost et al., 2004). However, for the purposes of this study, the four theories mentioned above
were found to be the most significant in establishing and converging SJT.
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theory and relevant related research before discussing SJT and its prospects in detail. Figure 1
provides SJT’s twenty propositions (See Figure 1).

Cognitive Dissonance
Both behavioral accounting research and CSR research define cognitive dissonance
(Festinger 1957) as individuals holding two incongruent beliefs, thoughts, or opinions, leading to
dissonance or a state of discomfort. The discomfort is exhibited by emotions such as guilt,
frustration, shame, or stress. Cognitive dissonance occurs when individuals face a situation that
may be potentially unpleasant or unwarranted and obstructs their goal. Individuals feel
discomfort when making a decision and selecting between two opposing alternatives. Cognitive
dissonance focuses on the individual-level rather than the organizational or social.
Cognitive dissonance theory was frequently used in behavioral accounting research in the
1970s and 1980s to explore accounting topics relating to budgets (Merchant 1985), managerial
attitude (Mia 1988), and managerial behavior (Foran and DeCoster 1977). More recent
behavioral accounting research has applied cognitive dissonance theory in examining asset
impairment (Rennekamp et al. 2015), management control (Anderson et al. 2017), and
management reporting (Church et al. 2014). Other research examines cognitive dissonance in
performance feedback (Thornock 2016), CEO deception (Hobson et al. 2017), and financial
misreporting (Hobson et al. 2012).
Behavioral accounting research applies cognitive dissonance theory in several ways.
First, prior behavioral accounting research examined what factors impact individuals’ cognitive
dissonance and how cognitive dissonance impacts individual decision-making. These factors
include poor performance, negative media or government exposure, and timing and type of
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employee feedback. Employees with poor performance experience an increase in cognitive
dissonance (i.e. attitude or motivation) and will increase their participation in budgeting
decisions to reduce the psychological unease (Mia 1988). Managers experience cognitive
dissonance when the news media presents negative information on an organization. These
managers reduce cognitive dissonance by modifying and improving CSR reporting (Adams and
Whelan 2009). Other research demonstrates how feedback or instructions impact cognitive
dissonance. Employees experience greater cognitive dissonance when feedback is provided
immediately before an incorrect decision, suggesting the employee performance is significantly
improved when feedback is given immediately after the implementation of an incorrect decision
(Thornock 2016). Similarly, auditors’ detection of fraud is improved, however, instructions need
to be provided before the auditors begin work (Hobson et al. 2017).
Second, prior behavioral accounting research examines ways to reduce cognitive
dissonance by resolving inconsistencies in their thoughts or beliefs and providing reasons for
their actions. Jermias (2001) finds that individuals rejected new costing systems and reduced
their sense of discomfort by believing alternative options are inefficient and inadequate.
However, individuals who rejected alternative costing systems desensitized themselves to
potential solutions that can mitigate current costing system issues, preventing change (Jermias
2001). To reduce the negative effect of cognitive dissonance, individuals have to believe that the
decision made is more desirable than its alternative (Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones 2007).
Individuals might experience this discomfort for up to three years if they do not attempt to
resolve inconsistencies in their beliefs, thoughts or opinions (Sharot et al. 2012). Only
individuals who feel responsible for the consequences or effects of their decision feel dissonance
(Harmon-Jones et al. 2008). Rennekamp et al. (2015) find that asset impairment judgements can
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differ based on whether managers feel responsible for the impairment and investment decision.
Other accounting research sheds further light on how we can measure cognitive dissonance
through speech analysis (Hobson et al. 2012). Table 1, Panel A, summarizes behavioral
accounting research relying on cognitive dissonance theory.
Although the application and advancement of cognitive dissonance in recent years is
sparse, the recent rise in CSR research has incrementally increased the relevance and utilization
of cognitive dissonance. With the rise of CSR research in accounting, initial cognitive
dissonance CSR work focused on explaining managerial and stakeholder sustainability decisionmaking (Adams and Whelan 2009). The majority of the behavioral accounting research applying
cognitive dissonance in a CSR setting has been published in the Journal of Business Ethics
(Andiappan and Dufour 2017; Bodur et al. 2015; Bonner et al. 2016; Lamm et al. 2015; Thomas
and Lamm 2012). CSR research on cognitive dissonance theory also examines factors affecting
cognitive dissonance, including attitudes and norms, and the effect of cognitive dissonance on
individual decision-making, including employee performance (Thomas and Lamm 2012).
Recent CSR research applying cognitive dissonance theory finds employees externalize
the responsibility to another source when performing a harm-doing activity, reducing their
feelings of guilt (Andiappan and Dufour 2017) and rationalize unethical behaviors by ignoring
any moral reasoning behind their behavior (Bonner et al. 2016). Cognitive dissonance can also
be used to influence change. Adams and Whelan (2009) argue that stakeholders can institute
change and increase organizations’ accountability for their sustainable performance.
Organizations are then faced with two conflicting demands relating to satisfying stakeholder
need for increased sustainability accountability and its own organizational need to maximize
wealth (Adams and Whelan 2009). Organizations might perceive stakeholder demand as an
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obstruction of their ability to maximize shareholder wealth, experiencing a state of discomfort.
Table 1, Panel B, reports the findings of CSR research using cognitive dissonance theory.
Table 1, Panel C, reports the findings of behavioral accounting research that indirectly
applies cognitive dissonance theory. These findings are similar to those reported above that
directly use cognitive dissonance theory. Although they do not specifically reference cognitive
dissonance theory, they indirectly discuss how cognitive dissonance plays a role in financial
(e.g., Georgiou 2018) and managerial decisions (e.g., Hope and Wang 2018; Rennekamp et al.
2018). Georgiou (2018) examines how investors evaluate information relating to fair value,
suggesting that cognitive dissonance plays a major role in determining what information
investors and analysts use to estimate fair value. Hope and Wang (2018) apply prior knowledge
about cognitive dissonance to understand how managerial deception is detected while
Rennekamp et al. (2018) demonstrate how individuals cognitively make unconscious judgments
that improve deception detection.

Social Identity Theory
Behavioral accounting research has been inconsistent in defining social identity theory.
Social identity theory (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1979) is defined as individuals’ role in
society dependent on their social association with other individuals and groups. Associated
groups influence the development of an individual’s personal, social, and economic identity.
Social identity theory is an individual’s placement or sense of belonging in society. Although
this is the most commonly used reference, behavioral accounting research has inconsistently
applied social identity theory. Prior behavioral accounting research applied the social identity
lens to evaluate social ties (Cardinaels and Dierynck 2017; Free and Murphy 2015; He et al.
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2017; Towry 2003), network ties (Brown and Drake 2014; Chua and Mahama 2007), and
friendship ties (Gu et al. 2018; Rose et al. 2014). Social identity theory is most commonly used
to describe social rather than the individual or organization.
Behavioral accounting research applies social identity theory more commonly than
cognitive dissonance, social dominance, or belief in a just world, especially regarding financial,
managerial, and audit-related topics. This wide range of application suggests that social identity
theory has become an over-applied theoretical lens that should be used cautiously given its
narrow and discrete foundation. It is necessary to consider other theoretical perspectives that
provide a holistic understanding and could be driving and motivating complex and relevant
accounting situations.
Social identity has been used in behavioral accounting research for two different reasons.
First, the research uses social identity to describe how different relationships affect individual
decision-making. These identities include auditors’ identification with their clients (Bauer 2015)
or committee members (Bruynseels et al. 2011; Cohen et al. 2017; He et al. 2017), committee
members’ social ties to the CEO (Wilbanks et al. 2017), accountants’ identification with an
accounting firm or member (Heinle et al. 2012; Iyer et al. 1997; Krishnan et al. 2011), firm
membership (Bills et al. 2018), accounting team identification (Towry 2003), organizational
identity (Anderson-Gough, Grey, and Robson 2001; Heinle et al. 2012), CEO friendship ties
(Rose et al. 2014), and social bonds (Free and Murphy 2015).
Second, behavioral accounting research examines the effects of social identity theory.
These effects can be either positive or negative, dependent on the contextual situation. Auditors’
professional identity improves auditor independence, however, stronger auditor identification
with a client reduces audit independence, leading auditors to agree more with client assessments
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(Bauer 2015). Audit committee members’ professional and social ties with an organization or
CEO also negatively impacts investors’ competence and effectiveness perceptions of the audit
committee (Cohen et al. 2017). Alumni identification with an accounting firm increases the
likelihood of the alum recommending and sending clients to the former accounting firm (Iyer et
al. 1997). Team identification can improve individual coordination and effectiveness (Towry
2003). Managers with a high organizational identity tend to receive greater incentives (Heinle et
al. 2012). Social ties between auditors and audit committee members could impair audit quality
and increase audit fees (He et al. 2017). CEOs with social ties to the director are more likely to
approve of the director’s proposed reduction in expenses, allowing the director to meet CEO’s
bonus targets (Rose et al. 2014). Employees who identify with each other are more likely to
commit fraud (Free and Murphy 2015). Table 2, Panel A, summarizes social identity theory in
behavioral accounting research.
Social identity theory also has been a frequently applied theoretical lens in CSR research
(He and Li 2011; Marin and Ruiz 2007; Marin et al. 2009; Turker 2009). Social identity theory’s
application in CSR research also is common in Journal of Business Ethics (Hoitash 2011; Kaplan
et al. 2015; Marin and Ruiz 2007; Marin et al. 2009; Turker 2009). CSR research examines
different factors that influence social identity (i.e., CSR initiatives) and types of social identity
(i.e., organizational, consumer) and their impact on individual decision-making.
Articles in Journal of Business Ethics have repeatedly applied social identity theory by
examining how organizational or individual identification is impacted by CSR and CSR
initiatives, finding that CSR initiatives can improve consumers’ social identification with an
organization (Marin et al. 2009). Companies that act sustainably and ethically responsible are
more likely to engage and maintain loyal customers (He and Li 2011). Additionally, when
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employees and managers socially identify with the company (i.e., organizational identity), the
organization tends to have stronger internal controls and decreased likelihood of a material
weakness. This is because managers who highly identify with the company are more likely to
exert greater effort in improving and maintaining strong internal controls. However, managers
who socially identify with their employees are more likely to compensate their employees more.
Research in Journal of Business Ethics also examines how an organization’s CSR and
employees’ social identification increases employees’ organizational commitment (Turker 2009).
Overall, CSR research on social identity theory suggests there are benefits associated from
developing and improving various types of social identification. One benefit is that companies
increasing their CSR engagement help customers identify with the company. This identification
can then be used to build customer loyalty, increasing the company’s exposure and potentially
improving the company’s financial position. Table 2, Panel B and C, summarizes the use of
social identity theory in CSR-related research. 6

Social Dominance Theory
Although social dominance theory has been rarely applied in accounting and CSR
research, the understanding and application of social dominance theory tends to overlap with
social identity theory. Social dominance theory (Sidanius and Pratto 1999) states that individuals
believe they are superior to other groups. Social dominance theory discusses the existence of
inequality among different social groups in the current social system (Pratto et al. 1994) or a
belief in a group-based hierarchy (Jost and Hunyady 2005; Jost and Thompson 2000; Sidanius

6

Libby, Rennekamp, and Seybert (2015) only briefly refer to social identity theory while reviewing prior
experimental and survey literature on earnings managements.
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and Pratto 1999). Social identity’s theoretical understanding regarding individuals’ need to
identify and make decisions with those whose values and interests align also reflects social
dominance theory’s predictions to an extent. Social dominance theory differs from social identity
in that individuals will choose to align themselves with groups they believe are superior.
Social dominance theory has rarely been applied in mainstream behavioral accounting
research. Social dominance theory is usually applied in critical research or non-mainstream
accounting (Kraten 2007; Murphy 2012). Research on social dominance is highly regarded in
psychology (Duckitt 2006; Gosling et al. 2003; Jost and Thompson 2000; Van Hiel et al. 2004),
management (Khan et al. 2018; Simmons and Umphress 2015), and ethics (Rosenblatt 2012).
Although, social dominance theory has been directly examined through other streams of
research, it is fairly common that accounting research indirectly applies social dominance theory.
For this reason, the discussion on social dominance theory is very limited.

Belief in a Just World
The concept of belief in a just world (Lerner 1980) holds that individuals get what they
deserve. Specifically, individuals find that the outcome suits the actions of the individual. Similar
to social dominance theory, behavioral accounting research has marginally applied belief in a
just world in examining accounting related topics. Prior behavioral accounting research utilized
belief in a just world to examine audit independence (Windsor and Ashkanasy 1995; Windsor
and Warming-Rasmussen 2009), client management bargaining power (Windsor and Ashkanasy
1995), and ethical decision-making (Ashkanasy et al. 2006). Similar to social dominance theory,
belief in a just world also has been extensively examined in psychology, investigating detection
accuracy (Schindler and Reinhard 2015), social goals (Sutton et al. 2017), and social categories
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(Correia et al. 2007). Given behavioral accounting research’s limited application of belief in a
just world and social dominance theory, the main focal point of the remainder of this paper will
be on cognitive dissonance and social identity theory.

System Justification Theory
Having explained each individual supporting theory and approaches taken by related
research, I move forward with explicating SJT and its promise for contributing to behavioral
accounting research. SJT (Jost and Banaji 1994) is a psychological theory stating that individuals
will justify the current status quo to boost the status quo’s legitimacy even at their own or their
group’s expense (Jost et al. 2004). SJT attempts to explain the most important social and
psychological factors driving individuals to perceive the existing social structure as good,
legitimate, and inevitable, and act in a manner that is in accordance with the current social
standards (Jost and Banaji 1994; Jost et al. 2004). SJT’s twenty propositions relate to
rationalizing the status quo, internalizing inequality, having justification tendencies related to
ego, group 7, and system, and reducing two inconsistent beliefs (Jost and Banaji 1994; Jost et al.
2004; Jost and Hunyady 2002). For example, SJT proposes that individuals disadvantaged by the
status quo (e.g. low income individuals) are more likely to unconsciously accept and internalize
their economic and social position in the system.
According to SJT, several individual judgments can be expected to hold true. Individuals
rationalize and defend the status quo in order to obtain a sense of certainty, stability, and safety

7

Ego justification is defined as the need to maintain a positive self-image while group justification refers to the
development of positive images of the group the individuals associate themselves with that can be based on various
factors such as social class, ethnicity, career, gender, etc. (Jost et al., 2004).
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in life, and to enhance or establish relationships (Jost et al. 2004, 2008). These reasons, as well as
others including the establishment of order and structure, explain why groups harmed by the
current system (i.e. disadvantaged groups) are willing to defend and boost the system’s
legitimacy (Jost and Hunyady 2002; Jost et al. 2008). Individuals also tend to defend the status
quo when there is a threat 8 to the system. Their defensive stance helps alleviate aversive
emotions such as frustration and guilt, and improve wellbeing in the short-term. However, in the
long-term, invoking system justification rationales exacerbates these individuals’ negative
emotions, including wellbeing (Jost and Thompson 2000).

Application of System Justification Theory in Behavioral Accounting Research
SJT, although a popular psychology theory used in social cognition, has yet to be utilized
and applied in behavioral accounting research. Although not specifically referencing SJT, prior
research examines some of SJT’s components relating to the effects of a status quo on individual
decision-making (Bazerman and Moore 2011; Beattie and Jones 2000; Fry et al. 2007; Kadous
and Sedor 2003; Messier et al. 2014). CSR research also examines status quo effects
(Bebbington and Fraser 2014; Cook 2009; Martinov-Bennie 2007), including how the social
norms affect governments’ decisions to deal with emission problems (Cook 2009). Behavioral
accounting research finds that the effect of status quo can have positive and negative effects on
individual decision-making, impacting how independent auditors make project-continuation
recommendations (Kadous and Sedor 2003) and how auditors apply accounting standards based
on prior year treatments (Messier et al. 2014). Behavioral accounting research has slowly begun

8

A threat to the system can take on many different forms. Normally, it can be an event, individual, ideology, or
behavior that is inconsistent with the current existing social structure.
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to explore the effect of status quo, but it lacks the understanding provided by SJT. SJT explains
the psychological and cognitive motivations driving individual decision-making. SJT can
provide a more holistic and thorough psychological understanding of individual decision-making
and this understanding is especially relevant given behavioral accounting’s complexity and
continued development within the CSR domain. However, this explanation and application is, at
times, unfortunately missing in behavioral accounting research, while the use of more narrow
theoretical perspectives persists. The reliance on discrete and narrow theoretical perspectives
might not provide behavioral accounting researchers sufficient understanding about emerging
complex accounting topics, and as such, it is crucial to examine other possible theoretical
perspectives that can provide a more thorough understanding.

Implications for Accounting Research
Prior research demonstrates there is interest in the understanding and application of
cognitive dissonance theory, social identity theory 9, and status quo effects. The following
discussion 10 offers broad research questions utilizing SJT for behavioral accounting researchers.
The use of SJT in current relevant accounting topics can potentially broaden and provide
superior understanding of individual decision-making because behavioral accounting is growing
too complex to study with a narrow theoretical lens. Examples of more specific research
opportunities using SJT are discussed in the following subsections.

9

Belief in a just world and social dominance theory are not frequently used in behavioral accounting research. This
is probably because both theories are classified as trait.
10
I categorize behavioral accounting research into the following dominant accounting research areas: auditing,
managerial, financial, and CSR/ESG. However, there may be overlaps between these dominant areas.
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Auditing
As illustrated above, understanding auditors’ decision-making through the cognitive
dissonance or social identity lens has been a popular topic of interest in behavioral accounting
research. SJT enhances this understanding by applying the theoretical underpinnings from both
cognitive dissonance theory and social identity theory. A substantial amount of complex auditing
topics could be explored with the application of SJT, and one of these is audit quality. SJT
suggests audit quality could be impacted by external threats to the auditors’ decisions and prior
decision-making. Applying SJT’s third proposition 11 on threats, external threats are events,
information, or individuals that cause auditors a sense of discomfort. Individuals are more likely
to defend the status quo or social system when faced with external threats. As an example,
auditors who feel threatened by their client will attempt to appease their client, further supporting
current practices. They can support current practices by referring to prior years’ information and
making similar decisions in the current and future audit, potentially at the risk of failing their due
diligence by not increasing their professional skepticism. They rationalize the external threat
(i.e., client pressure) and continue current processes by referring to prior year’s information by
socially categorizing and stereotyping the client (e.g. high versus low status or power). Auditors
who socially categorize their clients as high status or high power are more likely to appease the
client’s demands by using prior processes to dictate current and future audit procedures. The
application of SJT in the context of audit quality causes some concern because behavioral
accounting research has not fully examined the effects of external threats, social categorization,

11

SJT’s third proposition states that people will defend and justify the social system in response to threat by using
stereotypes to differentiate between high- and low-status groups to a greater degree (Jost and Banaji 1994).
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and prior decision-making on current and future decision-making. Therefore, I propose the
following research questions would be supported under SJT:
RQ1: When confronted with client pressure, how do auditors socially categorize their
client based on their status, and how does this categorization affect auditors’ decisions to
continue current processes by using prior years’ information?

Managerial Accounting
Behavioral research in managerial accounting tends to examine employee traits, CEO
compensation, and employee performance. Applying SJT can again broaden and enhance
knowledge more than does the application of cognitive dissonance or social identity theory.
Several of SJT’s theoretical propositions can be applied toward understanding complex topics in
managerial accounting. For example, Proposition #1b states that negative events are more likely
to be viewed positively if the likelihood of its occurrence is inevitable and near 12. As such,
individuals are more likely to view this forthcoming event positively, even if it is not rational or
consistent with the individuals’ values or prior beliefs. Applying this understanding to a
managerial setting, I propose that employees may be more willing to accept, and even favor, new
compensation schemes that might not necessarily be in their best interest. If the employee is
informed that this new compensation scheme is already implemented or the probability of its
implementation is evident, the employee is more likely to rationalize the new compensation
scheme, believing that there are positive effects of this implementation. Although rationally
counterintuitive, SJT suggests that individuals cope with the inevitability by consciously finding

12

Proposition 1 (b) of SJT states that individuals will rationalize the status quo judging likely events to be more
desirable than unlikely events, regardless if those events are attractive or unattractive (Jost and Banaji 1994).
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the event positive, reducing their cognitive dissonance and increasing their level of positive
affect. Therefore, I propose the following research question applying SJT into the managerial
context.
RQ2: Are employees more likely to reduce their cognitive dissonance and improve their
positive affect by accepting and even preferring a new compensation scheme as the likelihood of
its implementation becomes evident?

Financial Accounting
Behavioral studies in financial accounting focus primarily on CEO decision-making,
earnings management, and investor decision-making. SJT’s Proposition #2 states that individuals
use stereotypes to justify social and economic injustices, 13 while Proposition #7 states that
individuals’ behavior differs depending on their perception of the social system’s legitimacy 14.
Collectively, these two propositions suggest that as the legitimacy of the system increases,
individuals will use different types of stereotypes to rationalize social and economic injustices 15.
Applying this reasoning to financial accounting, investors focusing on companies that operate in
highly environmentally sensitive industries might stereotype the companies’ social and economic
impact (i.e., injustice) by believing that questionable behavior, such as an oil spill or using
unsustainable practices, is a way of cutting costs and follows normative business practices. A

13

SJT’s second proposition states that individuals will use stereotypes to rationalize social and economic status
differences between groups, and one group will be stereotyped differently depending on whether the group is
perceived to be high or low in status (Jost and Banaji 1994).
14
SJT’s seventh proposition states that as the perceived legitimacy of the system increases, members of high-status
(low-status) groups will exhibit increased in-group (outgroup) favoritism (Jost and Banaji 1994).
15
SJT’s second and seventh propositions are divided into differences in behavior based on the individual’s status
(i.e., high versus low status). In the following example, investors are categorized as a high status group and I do not
make inferences between investors, classified as a high status group, and a low status group.
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second justification is that these investors might use stereotypes to defend the practices of the
organizations and minimize the companies’ negative reputation. For example, investors might
claim that the company was unintentionally unethical where the unethical events that occurred
were beyond the organization’s control, or the company took immediate appropriate measure to
rectify the unethical behavior, rationalizing the company’s unethical behavior. Investors might
even place blame on specific victimless groups for the unethical behavior. This leads to the
following research question.
RQ3: Does a company’s questionable practice (i.e., economic or social injustice) (a)
impact investors’ perceptions of the company’s legitimacy, (b) impact who investors hold
responsible and blameless, and (c) deter investors or motivate them to invest in the company?
Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Social Governance
CSR research, like all other accounting areas, overlaps with other accounting research
topics. In the following section, I overlap CSR research with managerial accounting given there
are major similarities between managerial and CSR topics. As previously illustrated, behavioral
CSR research has risen in popularity as evidenced by the application of cognitive dissonance and
social identity theory in research published in Journal of Business Ethics. However, a wide range
of relevant CSR research questions still need to be investigated because CSR topics are
becoming extensive and, at times, convoluted and controversial (e.g. Bondy et al. 2012). One of
the most popular CSR topics is understanding an organization’s ethical behavior relating to the
environment. SJT proposes that individuals are likely to justify and rationalize a current
normative practice, even if this practice is not aligned with the individual’s best interest. SJT’s
Proposition #7 and #8 state that the legitimacy of current normative practice affects individuals’
behavior to support the practice, especially when individuals exhibit system justification
29

tendencies. 16 These two propositions suggest that as individuals’ system justification tendencies
increase, they are more likely to accept and rationalize a behavior if it is consistent with society’s
norms, including what other organizations are practicing, even if doing so is not in their best
interest. Applying this theoretical perspective in the CSR realm, SJT suggests that managers’
unethical behavior might be overlooked if stakeholders are aware that other organizations are
currently behaving similarly. 17 Stakeholders with greater system justification tendencies are
more likely to overlook managers’ unethical behavior. It is challenging for stakeholders to hold
one organization accountable when they have already accepted the same behavior from other
organizations. Holding one organization accountable while accepting other organizations’ poor
practices, would likely increase stakeholders’ cognitive dissonance. This explains why
organizations behaving similarly to others within their industry might not suffer negative
reputation effects. For instance, stakeholders may presume that firms in environmentally
sensitive industries are harming our environment, but rationalize this behavior because all
organizations within that industry are committing the same unethical act (i.e., harming the
environment). This leads to the next proposed CSR research question.
RQ4: When management behavior converges with other organizations’ behavior, can
stakeholders’ system justification tendencies explain whether they are willing to accept
management’s unethical behavior or hold management accountable?
Finally, SJT’s Proposition #1c states that individuals rationalize the status quo when their
motivational involvement is high rather than low. This suggests that managers with high rather

16

SJT’s eighth proposition states that as individual’s system justification tendencies increase, high-status (lowstatus) groups will exhibit increased in-group (outgroup) favoritism.
17
In this CSR example, stakeholders who hold limited power are considered low-status and would exhibit greater
outgroup favoritism as their system justification tendencies increase.
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than low motivational involvement are more likely to judge inevitable events as positive and as
the status quo. Based on SJT’s Proposition #7, this effect is also potentially exacerbated as the
perceived legitimacy of the event or status quo increases. Applying this understanding to
corporate social responsibility, managers with high motivational involvement in an
organization’s practices and who socially identify themselves as part of this legitimate
organization are more likely to behave in a way that is consistent with that organization’s
practices. This contention also suggests that low level managers are more likely to make
decisions consistent with upper management’s expectations, even if they appear potentially
unethical. This leads to the final proposed research question.
RQ5: Does low-level management’s motivational involvement with the organization and
their perception of the organization’s legitimacy affect their decision to defend upper
management’s unethical decisions?

Conclusion
In this study, I review how extant accounting research applies cognitive dissonance and
social identity theory into behavioral accounting and CSR research. This is relevant because
accounting and CSR research has become increasingly diverse and complex. Reviewing how
prior accounting research uses these two theoretical perspectives is needed to understand how we
can utilize other potential theoretical perspectives to address the emerging complex research
questions in behavioral accounting research. One such theoretical perspective, SJT, grounded in
cognitive dissonance theory, social identity theory, social dominance theory, and belief in a just
world, is a broad psychology theory that potentially could address those emerging behavioral
accounting research questions. SJT argues that individuals will support the status quo even
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against their own self-interest because of a collection of biases that drive individuals to make
irrational decisions.
I argue SJT provides a holistic and value-relevant way of examining behavioral
accounting and CSR research questions that cannot be addressed through the use of any of SJT’s
four foundational theories. SJT differs substantially from the underlying foundational theories
because a majority of SJT’s propositions cannot be applied using one or a combination of the
other theories. In fact, the research questions discussed above cannot be appropriately addressed
by any one, or any combination of the four theories because the propositions underlying the four
theories do not extend far enough to make a theoretical prediction. Therefore, the four theories
only provide a narrow perspective and are silent 18 on more complex behavioral accounting
topics. As such, SJT’s twenty propositions enhance the potential contributions of behavioral
accounting and CSR research because the propositions examine individuals’ cognitive, affective,
and behavioral processes impacting their decision-making. SJT suggests individuals’ attitudes,
beliefs, and thoughts drive their ideologies and dictate the individuals’ propensity to uphold the
status quo.
Applying this multi-dimensional and broad psychology theory to behavioral accounting
and CSR research provides several avenues for future behavioral accounting research. Future
research can further explore the proposed research questions or develop other research questions
by applying SJT. Several of SJT’s propositions were not utilized in the current study and future
behavioral accounting research could explore and apply them in other complex emerging topics.

18

The four theories propositions are very limited and given the growing complexity of accounting research, these
theories simply would not be applicable in addressing the broader and complicated accounting research questions
discussed.
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STUDY TWO: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCES DRIVING
MANAGEMENT’S DISCLOSURE OF OVERSTATED ENVIRONMENTAL
PROJECTIONS
Introduction
Public companies operating in industries where the environmental impact of day-to-day
operations is high (e.g. chemical, oil and gas) incur ongoing and substantial environmental
capital expenditures (ECE) to comply with environmental regulations related to pollution
abatement and control (Blanc et al., 2017). And while a considerable number of firms disclose in
their 10K reports current year spending on environmental capital projects (Cho et al., 2012a), a
subset of these also provide projections of future ECE. Patten (2005) compares the current year
environmental capital spending with prior year projections over the period 1993-2002, and finds
that projections were overstated for 76.1 percent of his 270 firm-year observations. For the
overwhelming majority of these cases, the actual spending was between 15 and 75 percent lower
than had been projected in the prior year. In contrast, Patten (2005) documents that projection
errors (the difference between projections and actual spending) for total capital expenditures
were very small and evenly distributed across over- and under-projections. Patten (2005) thus
argues managers’ ECE projections are more misleading than meaningful. 19
Chen et al. (2014) argue that managers potentially overstate environmental capital
spending projections to increase their company’s environmental legitimacy with investors and
other stakeholders. In support of this claim, they show that larger firms and those with worse
environmental performance are more likely to include overstated projections of future ECE.
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De Villiers and Van Staden (2011) similarly find that companies’ earnings projections relative to actual earnings
tend to be relatively accurate, suggesting difficulties with forecasting are likely not the cause of ECE projection
errors.
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However, given the size of environmental capital investments and their potential economic and
social consequences, it is important to better understand what might be driving managers’
seemingly systematic overstatement of future environmental capital spending.
In this study, I use systems justification theory (hereafter SJT), a psychological theory
explicitly developed to address individuals’ propensity to maintain and support the status quo
(Jost and Banaji, 1994; Jost and Hunyady, 2005), to examine whether maintaining the status quo
is one of the factors behind managers’ short-term decisions to overstate environmental
projections 20. Managers are almost certainly exposed to different sources of information when
projecting their company’s future ECEs. For example, managers might conduct several analyses
to predict possible future environmental capital spending (e.g. low- and high-end) based on
economic and social factors since these projects are often large in scale and costs and outcomes
can be uncertain. However, managers may receive conflicting demands from upper management,
shareholders, and other stakeholders when determining how much environmental spending
should be projected and disclosed (O’Sullivan, 2015). If comparable companies in a particular
industry tend to overstate their ECE, then other managers may follow suit by similarly disclosing
higher projections of future environmental spending.
According to SJT, the status quo represents the currently accepted social system, such as
the commonly accepted organizational practices and policies or industry norms, which are
legitimized by individuals’ acceptance of them and conformity with them (Haines and Jost,
2000; Jost, 1995; Jost and Hunyady, 2002, Jost et al. 2003a). I explore whether the presence of a
status quo affects managers’ beliefs that doing so is in their CEO’s and their own interest. SJT
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Patten (2005) finds that managers often overstate environmental projections over a multi-year period. The current
study only examines managers’ short-term disclosure decisions (i.e. a single year and one projection decision).
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suggests individuals often make decisions that preserve the status quo even at the expense of
their own economic self-interest (Henry and Saul, 2006; Jost, 1995; Jost et al., 2004, 2003b).
This view is contrary to agency theory which assumes agents will act according to their own
economic self-interest rather than against it (Baiman, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1988) unless provided
incentives to do otherwise, and thus firms must implement management control systems to curb
the otherwise self-interested decisions agents might make (Brown, Evans and Moser 2009;
Nyberg et al. 2010).
I further use SJT to examine whether, in the presence of a status quo condition, an outside
threat affects managers’ perceptions of the CEO’s pressure to improve the company’s
environmental image as an important factor in their environmental spending projections, and
whether they perceive doing so is in their CEO’s and their own best interest. SJT argues that
individuals rationalize and legitimize the status quo in the presence of a system threat. A system
threat represents any potential change or threat to the current status quo (Wakslak et al., 2011). A
system threat is anything that causes individuals to question their current behavior. For example,
managers could experience system threats from conflicting stakeholder demands through social
media. If stakeholders indicate they are dissatisfied with current company behavior, SJT suggests
managers will be more likely to support the status quo (e.g. Feygina et al., 2010; Jost et al.,
2007), in that the threat stimulates a defensive mechanism to “dig in their heels.” In the ECE
projection scenario, if stakeholder pressure threatens a company’s environmental legitimacy, I
expect managers to be more likely to choose to overstate environmental spending to mitigate the
stakeholder threats. Thus, the presence of a status quo condition and a threat to the social system
might explain why companies use overstated projections.
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In this study, I use experimental methods to examine whether maintaining the status quo
is one of the driving forces behind individual managers’ decisions to overstate projected ECE.
Based on SJT in this specific setting, I explore, first, whether managers who are aware of their
competitors’ ECE overstatements are more likely to overstate their own ECE projections, even if
projecting inaccurately is detrimental to their annual performance evaluation. Next, I test
whether managers aware of the overstatement status quo are more likely to conform to CEO
pressure to overstate ECE projections. According to SJT, I predict that managers will perceive
that overstating ECE projections aligns their interest with those of the CEO, even though doing
so actually harms the managers’ annual performance evaluations. SJT predicts that managers
will “dig in their heels” and become even more convinced that the status quo should guide their
decision making when they experience system threats. I examine how such threats impact
decision-making regarding ECE projections. I argue that managers who are aware of their
competitors’ ECE overstatements and experience a system threat are more likely to overstate
ECE projections than when a system threat is absent. Related to this, I anticipate that managers
aware of an overstatement status quo and receiving high pressure from stakeholders (system
threat) will be more likely to believe their CEO’s additional pressure to overstate is valid because
it is consistent with addressing stakeholder expectations as well as current industry behavior. In
this scenario, I expect that managers will be more likely to view CEO pressure to overstate
environmental projections as an important factor in their decision, and further to perceive,
falsely, that overstating ECE projections is in their own best interest.
To test these expectations, I use two 1x2 experiments with one overlapping cell. The
status quo and threat to the system are manipulated on a between-subjects basis. The status quo
is operationalized as present when all major competitors are overstating their ECE projections
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relative to actual ECE spending or absent when only about half of major competitor companies
overstate their ECE projections relative to actual ECE spending. System threat is operationalized
through an email received by participants in the status quo present condition from their boss
regarding an important and relevant news article indicating that the public is currently
disappointed with (high system threat) or indifferent to (low system threat) many of the
companies’ environmental activities. In the status quo absent condition, participants only receive
information relating to the low system threat.
Participants assumed the role of a Chief Sustainability Officer. All participants were
required to have prior or current managerial experience. Participants evaluated conflicting
stakeholder demands in projecting their company’s future ECEs and were paid a fixed salary
upon successful completion of the experiment. This design allowed me to understand the
psychological (cognitive dissonance, system justification) and economic (performance
evaluation) motivations driving managers to overstate a company’s ECE projections. Post
experimental questions were included to understand potential alternative explanations for
managers’ decision-making, including economic and psychological motivations. These post
experimental questions were then used as support for my mediation analyses.
The results of this study provide potential explanations for why managers may be willing
to overstate ECEs. Results show managers are more likely to overstate environmental projections
in the presence of an overstatement status quo than in its absence. Further, mediation analysis
explains this behavior by showing that managers perceive CEO pressure to overstate is in their
best interest, even while overstating negatively impacts their annual performance evaluation. I
also find that when managers are aware of the overstatement status quo, they are more likely to
overstate ECE projections when they experience a high as opposed to low system threat,
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indicating that managers are more likely to maintain the status quo and “dig in their heels” when
they experience greater stakeholder dissatisfaction about their company’s environmental
performance. Finally, results indicate managers believe their CEO’s pressure to overstate is an
important factor in their environmental projections, further leading them to perceive that doing
so is in their best interest. The results suggest that the additive effect of an overstatement status
quo and a threat to the social system positively influences managers’ perceptions of and
willingness to overstate environmental projections, even at their own expense.
This study contributes to management accounting research by applying a new psychology
perspective, SJT, to explore managerial decision-making. It advances understanding of the effect
of a status quo condition and threats to the status quo on management decisions. Results are
consistent with predictions from SJT (Jost et al., 2003a), including that the status quo dominates
managers’ decisions (Dean et al., 2017). This effect is further exacerbated when a system threat
is present (e.g. Jost and Kay, 2005; Jost et al., 2007; Wakslak et al., 2011) in that managers who
are aware of stakeholders’ negative opinion about their organization are more likely to select the
status quo alternative because they “dig in their heels” under the threat to their current normative
behavior. The study thus provides evidence on the power of social norm maintenance in
organizational settings and the influence that threats to the social system have on managers’
interest in maintaining the status quo.
This examination also extends social and environmental accounting research. Cho et al.
(2012a) call for more careful understanding of the underlying motivations behind companies’
environmental disclosures, and I address this call by demonstrating that these disclosure
decisions are cognitively and psychologically affected by the presence of a societal status quo.
My results indicate managers’ willingness to overstate ECE projections appear to be based on
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whether such overstatements are part of a social system and whether managers are aware of this
social system. Managers aware of an overstatement status quo appear to behave consistently with
this normative practice as a way to reduce cognitive unease and to increase satisfaction, and this
is exacerbated in the presence of a stakeholder threat. The results thus provide a richer
understanding of how managers may be willing to use such disclosures as a legitimating tool
(Chen et al., 2014; Cho and Patten, 2010).
My findings also contribute to practice by providing understanding as to why managers
make certain environmental and sustainability disclosure decisions. The findings of this study
suggest that the accuracy of managers’ disclosures is negatively influenced by a known status
quo, in my case the company’s prior behavior or the industry’s environmental disclosure norms,
and by a system threat, operationalized as stakeholder demands in this study. Individuals’
decisions, however, are dominated by the presence of the status quo and a system threat. Given
this understanding, it is essential for practice to develop better measures to ensure managers are
not making decisions that align with normative practices, but are evaluating all environmental
and sustainability options. These measures need to be put in place to help managers’ overcome
system justification tendencies in order to improve judgment and decision making. When
determining environmental and sustainability disclosures, managers need to carefully evaluate
whether their own decisions align with industry practice or with the company’s prior practices,
potentially reducing normative behavior and increasing positive change in an organization.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theory and
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the method, design, and procedures. Section 4 discusses the
results of the experiment and Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the findings and the
limitations of the study.
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Theory and Hypotheses
System Justification Theory
SJT is defined as the “process by which existing social arrangements are legitimized,
even at the expense of personal and group interest” (Jost and Banaji, 1994). SJT holds that
individuals often believe the current social system is legitimate, natural, and perpetual (Jost and
Hunyady, 2002) despite the fact that the system has debilitating effects on society and/or their
own self-interest (Jost and Banaji, 1994). Some of these debilitating effects include domination,
control, powerlessness, and even oppression (e.g. Haines & Jost, 2000; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost
& Hunyady, 2002). Prior research finds that U.S. citizens were less likely to protest or vote even
if these actions contributed to their economic well-being because they feared that protesting and
voting were ineffective or dangerous (Jost et al., 2017). Individuals support the status quo at all
costs (Jost and Banaji, 1994) because they are socially influenced (Haines and Jost, 2000; Jost
and Hunyady, 2002; Raven, 1993) by powerful individuals and companies to continue to support
the current social system and its potentially debilitating effects (Van der Toorn et al., 2011).
Individuals’ support of the status quo at all costs stems from their need to reduce
uncertainty, manage external threats, increase positive affect 21, and hold shared common
interests with others (Jost et al., 2008). SJT argues that individuals believe that they are incapable
of taking action against the present social structure because they are made to feel inferior and
deserving of their misfortune and oppression (Jost, 1995). For example, individuals who are
considered disadvantaged or powerless (e.g. those not in authority) perceive present social
arrangements as fair, justified, and inevitable; thus, rationalizing their own current misfortunate
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Affect is described as the emotion individuals have about their decisions, such as emotional distress (Napier et
al., 2006).
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circumstances and accepting the way society is structured (Haines and Jost, 2000). Prior research
finds that employees considering themselves powerless in their employment were more likely to
view their supervisor as legitimate and maintain inequality in the workplace even when this
inequality was explicitly known to the employees (van der Toorn et al., 2015). Even more
surprising, male employees were significantly more likely to uphold the status quo and gender
inequalities than women, especially when men socially identified with their gender group (Kray
et al., 2017).
SJT suggests that individuals follow the current social system by behaving and making
decisions that are consistent with its ideologies (Jost and Banaji, 1994). According to Jost and
Banaji (1994), a social system represents any normative behavior that is accepted and upheld by
the individuals who live within that society. Such a system can have either a broad scope (e.g.,
gender inequality and climate change) or a narrow scope (e.g., stereotyping or social
identification), where ECE overstatement would be considered as the latter. Individuals want to
hold favorable opinions about the society in which they live (Jost et al., 2004). For example,
individuals making decisions that align with the status quo can reduce their cognitive dissonance.
Individuals also justify (Jost et al., 2004) and exaggerate the benefits of the status quo (Jost and
Hunyady, 2005) when they identify with a social group (Kray et al., 2017). For example,
individuals synchronize their behavior with the current social system and make decisions based
on what is already accepted by society (Jost et al., 2004) or consistent with their prior beliefs.
While not explicitly relying on SJT, prior studies evaluate justification relative to a status
quo. Status quo dominates decisions in auditing (Messier et al., 2014), psychology (van der
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Toorn et al., 2015; Wakslak et al., 2011) 22, information technology (Kim and Kankanhalli,
2009), and environmental and sustainability (Montpetit and Lachapelle, 2017). Status quo
dominance is evident in individual decision-making, including managerial choices (Samuelson
and Zeckhauser, 1988). When making complex decisions, managers make choices that
correspond to the status quo (Gould, 2002; Tortoriello et al., 2011) and focus on the status quo
(Dean et al., 2017) to induce individual positive affect. As such, status quo dominance could
influence managers’ ECE disclosure decisions if the overstatement of ECE projections is already
considered a normative practice.

Hypotheses 1 & 2 – The Impact of Status Quo on Decision-Making
Prior research indicates that many managers overstate their ECE projections relative to
actual ECE amounts in the following year (Patten, 2005; Chen et al., 2014). This type of
behavior is commonly referred to as status quo dependence (e.g. Dean et al. 2017). Managers are
reluctant to take on the risk of making decisions that do not align with the status quo because
these decisions might result in uncertainty (Haines and Jost, 2000; Jost and Hunyady, 2005),
negative affect, and decreased self-esteem (Jost and Hunyady, 2005). By making decisions that
align with other companies in the industry, managers reduce their cognitive dissonance and
socially identify with those companies.
Managers anchor their decisions on the current status quo (Gärtner, 2018) regardless of
the consequences associated with supporting the status quo (Jost and Banaji, 1994). Prior
research finds that efficiency-enhancing policies are difficult to implement because individuals
have a tendency to reject uncertainty (Fernandez and Rodrik, 2016) and sense a need to reduce
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van der Toorn et al., 2015; Wakslak et al., 2011 specifically rely on SJT.
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guilt in order to maintain the current status quo (Dean et al., 2017). Anchoring on the status quo
can result in selecting riskier options (Dean et al., 2017); more so when managers have an
overwhelming amount of choices (Chernev et al., 2015).
Managers face a broad range of alternatives when determining how much ECE to project.
Not only are the alternatives significant and overwhelming, the subjectivity and complexity of
ECE projections are also large. SJT proposes that managers evaluating multiple and complex
alternatives weight the status quo option heavier than the alternatives (Dean et al., 2017). Given
the complexity of environmental reporting, managers rely on the status quo option, specifically
the decisions of the industry to guide their ECE projections. The current industry practice
suggests that managers are manipulating and overstating ECE projections relative to actual ECE
amounts in the subsequent year. Therefore, when the status quo is present, managers are likely to
anchor on the status quo option and make similar ECE projections to the industry relative to
when the status quo is absent. These arguments lead to the first hypothesis:
H1: Managers will overstate their ECE projections more in the presence of an overstatement
status quo than in its absence.
There are several reasons why managers depend on the status quo. First, managers tend to
make decisions based on a priori beliefs about their membership in a group (Alcantud and
Laruelle, 2018). Managers are more likely to preserve the status quo when they are associated
with a group. Second, managers are commonly aware of the status quo or the default choice. The
status quo or default option always receives significant attention and this attention increases as
the number of alternatives and complexity of the decision increase (Dean et al., 2017). Third,
managers are more likely to select the status quo option to induce positive affect (Jost and
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Hunyady, 2005) 23. Fourth, and the most likely explanation in this study, given the complexity of
the decision, managers might evaluate all information received and select the option that is most
consistent overall.
SJT states that individuals maintain the status quo even if doing so is against their own
best interest. When individuals are overwhelmed with the amount of choices, SJT suggests they
will anchor on information that is consistent with the status quo. Therefore, if industry behavior
and CEO’s expectations suggest an overstatement status quo 24, I expect managers to anchor on
this information believing that behaving consistently with the industry and their CEO’s
expectation is in their own best interest because it satisfies the majority of the parties involved.
This reasoning leads to the following mediation prediction:
H2: When there is an overstatement status quo relative to its absence, managers will overstate
their ECE projections because they perceive doing so is in their CEO’s and their own best
interest.

Hypotheses 3 & 4 – The Impact of a System Threat on Decision-Making
SJT contends that individuals are more prone toward system justification beliefs when
confronted with a system threat (Blasi and Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2003a; Wakslak et al., 2011),
exacerbating the status quo bias. A system threat signifies a conflict with the current social
system (e.g. Napier, Mandisodza, Andersen, and Jost, 2006). A system threat can range from
stakeholder dissatisfaction to a change in an organization’s management. For example, Kay, Jost,
23
The first three reasons provided represent prior literature’s explanations for why managers depend on the status
quo. In this study, participants were not primed about their membership to a group, were not aware of the default
option, and would not experience positive affect.
24
Chen et al. (2014) find that companies overstate ECE projections as a potential legitimizing tool to enhance the
company’s environmental image. It seems plausible, therefore, that the CEOs of these companies potentially
pressure managers to use ECE projections as a legitimizing tool.
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and Young (2005) examine how a news article threatening and criticizing America’s social,
economic, and political culture impacts individuals’ opinion of powerful and obese individuals’
personality traits. Individuals reading a highly critical article about America (i.e. high system
threat) evaluated powerful people as intelligent and independent, but unhappy, while perceiving
obese individuals as lazy and unsociable, demonstrating how a system threat increases current
known biases and stereotypes. Individuals increasing their stereotypes under a system threat is
another way of justifying the status quo. Similarly, managers who are dependent on their job and
feel a sense of powerlessness are more likely to find their supervisor and organization more
legitimate (e.g. van der Toorn et al., 2015). Managers might feel threatened by the loss of their
job and, therefore, find their current employment, supervisor, and organization more legitimate.
Threats tend to disrupt individuals’ sense of comfort and individuals faced with system threats
are more likely to support current policies because they provide a sense of familiarity and
certainty.
Prior research determined that participants’ support of the status quo increases as the
level of perceived threat increases (e.g. Kay et al., 2005; Lau, Kay, and Spencer, 2008; Ullrich
and Cohrs, 2007). The level of perceived threat forces individuals to acknowledge the
imperfections of the current social structure, internalize and take responsibility for those
imperfections, and accept a new status quo (Feygina et al., 2010). Acknowledging these
imperfections results in increased psychological anxiety (Proudfoot and Kay, 2014). Prior
research finds that managers resisted implementation of a new technology (system threat) until it
was more than probable of being implemented (e.g. Kim & Kankanhalli, 2009). Managers under
a high level of perceived threat are fearful of the uncertainty of committing to a new status quo
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(Kim and Kankanhalli, 2009). By maintaining the current status quo, managers are reducing their
cognitive dissonance and psychological anxiety.
SJT’s discussion on status quo and system threat differ from resistance to change. Prior
organizational behavior argues that individuals have a choice in whether to accept or resist
potential reforms (e.g. Fosfuri and Rønde, 2009; Krügel and Traub, 2018). However, SJT argues
that individuals do not have free will in accepting or resisting the status quo (Jost et al., 2003a,
2007). Rather, individuals tend to unconsciously support the status quo (Jost et al., 2003a, 2007)
and therefore do not have free will in making decisions.
Individuals’ continuous support under a system threat arises from cognitive factors such
as loss aversion (Proudfoot and Kay, 2014). The status quo is typically perceived as a reference
point and any deviation from the status quo is perceived as a loss (Kahneman et al., 1991).
Managers perceive mergers and acquisitions and industry competition as external threats to the
legitimacy of their company and, therefore, deviations from the status quo (Proudfoot and Kay,
2014). Riketta & Landerer (2005) find that a negative company scandal increases managers’
need to bolster the company’s legitimacy. Given that the scandal represents a deviation from the
status quo, managers are more likely to experience psychological anxiety and cognitive
dissonance and less likely to support the deviation. Therefore, the level of perceived threat
stimulates managers’ defensive psychological reaction to further support the status quo
(Proudfoot and Kay, 2014).
SJT states a system threat represents any potential change or threat to the current social
system (Wakslak et al., 2011). A system threat is anything that causes individuals to question
their current behavior, including stakeholder dissatisfaction. Managers receive demands from
multiple stakeholders to improve environmental performance. If managers learn that
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stakeholders are dissatisfied with the amount of environmental spending, their current normative
behavior might be threatened leading them to “dig in their heels”. Managers who “dig in their
heels” are more likely to continue overstating their environmental projections, using the
disclosure as a legitimizing tool to enhance their environmental image. Driven by an increased
need to reduce psychological anxiety and cognitive dissonance, managers are more likely to
support the present status quo when this perceived level of threat increases. Thus, the following
hypothesis is proposed:
H3: In the presence of an overstatement status quo, managers who experience a high system
threat will overstate their ECE projections more than managers who experience a low system
threat.
Managers experiencing greater threats are also more likely to make decisions consistent
with the industry with the potential hope of mitigating the threat. According to legitimacy theory
(Deegan, 2006; Deephouse and Suchman 1995), companies under environmental scrutiny are
more likely to overstate ECE projections in an attempt to improve their environmental image
(Chen et al. 2014). Managers experiencing a high system threat are more likely to believe their
CEO’s pressure to overstate ECE projections in order to respond to stakeholder pressure is an
important factor in their projection decision. Further, they are more inclined to believe that
doing so is in their CEO’s and their own best interest, even though it may negatively impact their
annual performance evaluation from the Board of Directors 25. When there is an overstatement
status quo and an exacerbating system threat, managers are more likely to view CEO pressure to
overstate environmental projections as an important factor in their environmental projection,

25

This study examines managers’ one-period decisions. I argue managers may be willing to align their interests
with the industry and CEO even though doing so harms their short term interest (i.e. annual performance review by
the Board of Directors), because they believe long-term impacts are more important.
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aligning their own interest with those of the CEO, even at their own expense. Given the additive
negative effect of an overstatement status quo and a high system threat, managers are more likely
to view CEO pressure to overstate as legitimate and more likely to believe doing so is in their
best interest. This leads to the following mediation prediction:
H4: In the presence of an overstatement status quo and high relative to low system threat,
managers will overstate their ECE projections because of CEO pressure to overstate and,
therefore, will perceive doing so is in their CEO’s and their own best interest.

Methods
Participants
Responses are gathered from managers via Turk Prime. Participants were required to
answer several screening questions and to be past or current managers responsible for a
company’s operations. They answered several additional questions about their company’s
involvement in environmental projects and their comfort evaluating a company’s performance by
analyzing its annual reports and 10K reports. A total of 30 percent of the participants (57
participants) agreed that they felt comfortable evaluating a company’s financial or environmental
performance while 39 percent of the participants (74 participants) somewhat agreed they felt
comfortable evaluating a company’s financial or environmental performance. Review questions
were presented throughout the experiment. All participants who successfully passed the
screening questions and passed 67% (2 of 3) of the review questions 26 were compensated a fixed
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Review questions evaluated participants’ understanding of the range of possible ECE spending in the following
year, whether the Board of Directors weights their environmental projections as a factor in their annual performance
review (i.e. lower value symbolizes a more accurate valuation), and the amount the CEO expects to be projected
even though it will harm their annual performance review.

55

amount of $2.00. A total final sample consisted of 192 participants, of which 126 were male and
66 were female. The average participant age was 37 years.

Experimental Method and Design
To test the hypotheses, this study employed two 1 X 2 between-subjects experiments with
one overlapping cell. The first independent variable, STATUS QUO, was manipulated at two
levels (status quo is PRESENT vs. ABSENT). In the PRESENT status quo condition, participants
were informed that all of their competitors have previously overstated their ECE projections. In
the condition where status quo is ABSENT, participants were informed that not all competitors
overstated their ECE projections. Therefore, in this condition, the status quo is not clear. The
second independent variable, THREAT, was manipulated as either a HIGH or LOW threat to
environmental reporting. A system threat was manipulated by providing participants information
about society’s current satisfaction with companies’ environmental outreach. Participants in the
high (low) system threat condition learned that society was dissatisfied (indifferent) with
companies in the oil and gas industry’s environmental outreach (see Appendix A and B for
STAUS QUO and THREAT conditions).
The experimental materials were distributed to the participants via Qualtrics on Turk
Prime. Participants were instructed to assume the role of a manager at a hypothetical oil and gas
company. They were informed that their task was to evaluate only the information given to
project ECE for the following year. All participants were informed of ABC Company’s prior
ECE projections and actual ECE spending, indicating an overstatement. Given the uncertainty of
ECE projections, participants were informed by their team that actual ECE spending for the next
year could range from $600 million to $1 billion, representing a wide range of possibilities.
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Participants were told their annual performance evaluation by the Board of Directors heavily
weighted toward the accuracy of their ECE projections relative to actual amounts. Thus,
projecting ECE amounts closer to actual spending was expected to improve participants’ annual
performance evaluation. All participants made decisions under this same performance evaluation
pressure which allows me to evaluate the strength of managers’ need to maintain the status quo
over and above their preference for a positive performance evaluation. Next, participants
received advice from the CEO to select an ECE projection near the high-end case scenario of $1
billion. Then, participants were randomly assigned to conditions where they received
information on the current disclosures of future ECEs by other firms in their industry. These
disclosures were consistent with either an overstatement status quo or no obvious status quo.
Next, participants received a news article passed on by their CEO on environmental reporting,
indicating stakeholders’ environmental demands from firms in the oil and gas industry. The news
article depicted either a low or high system threat. Participants then chose the amount of ECE to
disclose and completed a post experimental and demographics questionnaire. 27

Dependent Variables
I measure managers’ ECE projections using two different methods. First, before
indicating the amount of their ECE projection, participants were asked whether they will
overstate ECEs in the following year (Yes/No). This dependent variable, labeled OVERSTATE,
reflects managers’ willingness to overstate ECE amounts.
Second, participants made ECE projections (labeled ECE) for 2018 using a sliding scale
where they indicated dollar projections in amounts that could range between $600 million and $1

27

Demographic questions were examined for potential covariates and none were identified (p<0.05)
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billion. Higher environmental capital projections represent greater support for the
(overstatement) status quo.

Mediator Variables
Participants answered several post-experimental questions (PEQs). The first PEQ
(Alignment of Interest) asked the following: “Projecting higher ECEs to satisfy my CEO was in
my best interest.” Alignment of Interest examines whether individuals believe maintaining the
status quo by satisfying their CEO (e.g. overstating ECE projections) is in their best interest
when knowingly harming their annual performance reviews. Participants responded on a 7-point
Likert scale with “Strongly Disagree” and “Strongly Agree” endpoints. The second PEQ
(Importance of CEO Interest) asked the participants to indicate their degree of agreement with
the following statement: “The CEO’s interest in improving ABC Company’s environmental
legitimacy with current and future shareholders was an important factor in my environmental
capital spending projection.” Participants also responded on a 7-point Likert scale with “Strongly
Disagree” and “Strongly Agree” endpoints.

Results
Manipulation Checks
To ensure the participants recognized that overstatement was (or was not) the status quo,
they indicated their degree of agreement with the following question on a 7-point Likert scale
with endpoints of “Strongly Disagree” and “Strongly Agree”: “All of ABC Company’s main
competitors overstated their environmental capital projections in their 10K reports relative to
their actual spending on these projects in the following year.” As expected, participants in the
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PRESENT status quo condition agreed that all of ABC Company’s main competitors overstated
their environmental projections in their 10K reports relative to their actual spending on these
projects in the following year (means = 6.08, std. dev= 1.27) statistically significantly more than
the ABSENT condition (means= 2.66, std. dev = 1.80, mean difference = -3.42) (t= -12.46,
p<0.001). To capture participants’ understanding of the presence of a high versus low system
threat, they indicated their degree of agreement with the following question on a 7-point Likert
scale with endpoints “Strongly Disagree” and “Strongly Agree”: “According to the news article
provided by the CEO, survey respondents demand more investment in environmental projects by
companies in the oil and gas industry.” Participants in the HIGH system threat condition agreed
that survey respondents demand more investment in environmental projects by companies in the
oil and gas (means = 6.33, std. dev = 1.23) statistically significantly more than the LOW
condition (means = 2.80, std. dev = 1.88, mean difference = -3.53) (t = -12.61, p < 0.001).

Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for OVERSTATE are presented in Table 3, Panel A. Managers in all
conditions responded to this measure first. Results indicate that participants’ willingness to
overstate increases in the presence of a status quo (66.2%) relative to its absence (50%) and is
further exacerbated when there is a high (93.7%) relative to a low system threat (66.2%).
Descriptive statistics for ECE projections are presented in Table 3, Panel B. Results indicate that
the mean [std. dev] ECE in the ABSENT status quo and LOW system threat is $823.02 [$97.52]
million and $854.86 [$104.29] million in the PRESENT status quo and LOW system threat.
Table 3, Panel C shows that the mean Alignment of Interest in the PRESENT status quo
condition was 4.95 (std. dev. = 1.70) while in the ABSENT status quo condition had a mean of
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4.25 (std. dev. = 1.67). Alignment of Interest in the HIGH relative to the LOW condition was 5.75
(std. dev. = 1.43) and 4.95 (std. dev. = 1.70), respectively, indicating that as the status quo
becomes more prominent with an additive system threat, the more likely managers believe their
interest coincides with the CEO’s interest. Participants also responded to a second PEQ
regarding their perceptions of the CEO’s interest in improving the company’s environmental
legitimacy. The results show that the mean in the HIGH condition was 5.75 (std. dev. = 1.54)
while the mean in the LOW condition was 4.98 (std. dev. = 1.62).

Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 predicts that managers will be more likely to overstate ECE projections in
the presence of an overstatement status quo than in its absence. Results of a Chi-square test for
differences in proportion are presented in Table 4, Panel A. Results indicate that managers’
willingness to OVERSTATE is higher in the presence of an overstatement status quo than in its
absence (χ(1) 2 = 3.46, p=0.06). These results are further supported by comparing the mean
differences in ECE projections between the status quo present and absent conditions. Table 4,
Panel B presents these comparisons. Results indicate that managers’ willingness to intentionally
overstate environmental projections is higher in the presence of an overstatement status quo than
in its absence (t(127) = -1.79, p = 0.04, one-tailed). Thus, H1 is supported.

Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 posits that managers will overstate ECE projections more when status quo
is present relative to absent because they believe doing so is in their CEO’s and their own best
interest. Hypothesis 2 is tested by using two conditions (status quo PRESENT versus ABSENT),
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where the presence of the system threat is constant. Table 5 presents independent t-test results for
managers’ Alignment of Interest decisions, showing that managers are more likely to overstate
ECE projections because they believe doing so is in their CEO’s and their own interest more
when status quo is present relative to being absent (t = -2.37, p = 0.01, one-tailed). I conducted
mediation analysis to investigate how much of the effect of the status quo PRESENT and
ABSENT condition on ECE projections is explained through participants’ perceptions of the
CEO’s and their own interest. Figure 2 presents the results of the mediation analysis. Consistent
with my expectations about managers’ psychological motivations and using Preacher and Hayes’
(2008) bias-corrected bootstrapping method, I find that Alignment of Interest fully mediates the
effect of STATUS QUO (ABSENT versus PRESENT) on ECE, keeping THREAT constant. Thus,
H2 is supported.

Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 posits that managers are more likely to overstate ECE projections when
managers in the status quo present condition experience a high versus a low threat to the system.
I test hypothesis 3 using the two conditions (HIGH versus LOW system threat), where the
presence of the status quo is constant. Table 6, Panel A presents the results for managers’
OVERSTATE decisions, showing that managers are more likely to overstate environmental
projections when there is a high relative to a low system threat (χ(1) 2 = 29.78, p<0.001). Results
presented in Table 6, Panel B, indicate that in the presence of the status quo, managers select
higher ECE projections in the presence of a high system threat (t(123) = -2.61, p = 0.005, onetailed). The results support H3 and indicate that managers’ tendencies to overstate environmental
capital projections are significantly greater when there is a high system threat.
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Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4 posits that managers are more likely to overstate ECE projections when
there is a high relative to low system threat because they find the CEO’s pressure to overstate as
an important factor in their disclosure decision, leading managers to align their own interests
with those of the CEO. I conducted an independent t-test to test this prediction. Table 7 shows
that managers are more likely to perceive the CEO pressure to overstate as an important factor in
their environmental decision when there is a high relative to a low system threat (t= 2.72, p =
0.004, one-tailed). Managers also believe the CEO’s interest aligns with their own interest,
leading them to overstate ECE projections more when there is a high relative to a low system
threat (t = -2.86, p = 0.003, one-tailed). I again use mediation analysis following Preacher &
Hayes (2008) to test whether the effect of system threat on ECE projections is explained by
Importance of CEO Interest and Alignment of Interest. Figure 3 summarizes the analysis of
THREAT (LOW versus HIGH), and it shows that Alignment of Interest fully mediates the effect
of THREAT on ECE. I further find that the effect of THREAT on ECE is fully mediated through
Importance of CEO Interest and Alignment of Interest. Figure 3 presents these results and has
several implications. First, managers’ ECE projections are driven by the presence of a status quo
and the level of a system threat. Second, the additive effect of a high system threat increases
managers’ perceptions of CEO pressure to overstate environmental projections. When there is a
high system threat, managers are more likely to view CEO pressure to overstate environmental
projections as an important factor in their environmental projections and further believe that
doing so is in their own best interest while negatively impacting their annual evaluation by the
Board of Directors. In sum, the presence of a status quo and the level of a threat on the social
system are driving managers to perceive CEO’s demand to overstate as an important factor in
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their environmental projection decision, and further, to believe that overstating these
environmental projections is in their own benefit when this is not necessarily the case.

Discussion
In this study, I use SJT to better understand why managers choose to overstate ECE. The
experiment is situated in a unique setting where managers must consider relevant pieces of
information to project future environmental spending. My empirical results are consistent with
SJT and suggest that in the short-term, managers are more likely to overstate in the presence of
an overstatement status quo than in its absence. Findings also indicate that managers are more
likely to overstate environmental projections when there is an overstatement status quo and a
high relative to a low system threat. The results suggest that managers use environmental
projections as a legitimizing tool to enhance their company’s environmental image as a means to
behave consistently with other companies, and this is exacerbated when managers feel threated
by stakeholder dissatisfaction. SJT explains this latter finding as managers behaving consistently
with other companies in the presence of a system threat are potentially reducing their cognitive
dissonance while increasing their positive satisfaction. Managers’ use of projections as a
legitimizing tool can also explain why managers perceive overstating environmental projections
is in their own best interest, providing additional support for why we might be seeing this
phenomenon in the real world.
Post-experimental questions about managers’ psychological motivations indicate that
managers believe that projecting high environmental projections is in their best interest.
Specifically, the presence of a status quo increases managers’ beliefs that projecting large
environmental projections is in their best interest. Further, managers are more likely to perceive
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the CEO’s pressure to improve the company’s environmental image as an important factor in
their disclosure decision when there is a high system threat opposed to a low system threat,
further exacerbating managers’ ECE overstatement amounts. When there is a high system threat,
managers find their CEO’s pressure to improve the company’s environmental decision as an
important factor in their environmental projection decisions. These results suggest users of ECE
disclosures should use caution, as managers might be using projections as a legitimizing tool to
divert external threats. The results provide evidence of managers’ short-term disclosure
decisions, indicating that these disclosures might not be credible and embody “cheap talk”
(Farrell and Rabin, 1996).
This paper contributes to management accounting research by applying SJT, a
psychology theory, and investigating its ability to explain management decisions. SJT postulates,
and the experimental evidence supports, that managers behave consistently with social norms
existing in the industry in which the managers operate. Further, managers impacted by threats to
these social norms are more likely to “dig in their heels.” The results of the study provide
evidence of the effects of social norms and threats to those social norms on managers’ decisions.
My findings also contribute to the social and environmental accounting and disclosure
literature (Cho et al., 2012b, 2015, 2014, 2010; Milne and Patten, 2002; Patten 2002) by
identifying factors driving managers to make certain environmental disclosure decisions. Cho et
al. (2012a) call for the careful understanding of the underlying motivations of these
environmental disclosures, and this study provides evidence of two potential social factors
affecting managers’ willingness to overstate ECE projections: status quo and a threat to the
social system.
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The results of this analysis present several avenues for future research. First, this study
holds the managers’ interest constant across conditions reflected by the Board of Directors’
performance evaluations of the managers’ environmental projections. To induce a more salient
effect of manager interest, future research could utilize an alternative economic incentive
whereby managers are financially incentivized to report more honestly. Second, this study
examines managers’ environmental decisions at one point in time while prior research indicates
overstatement is repeated over time. Future research could examine whether managers’
environmental disclosure decisions are impacted over time if properly financially incentivized.
In sum, the results of this investigation indicate that social drivers induce managers to
overstate ECE projections and this effect is explained by managers’ legitimacy perceptions of
their CEO’s pressure to improve the company’s environmental image. These legitimacy
perceptions appear to inhibit managers from acting in their own best interest, creating potentially
unintended consequences for managers, shareholders, and users of voluntary environmental
disclosures.
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GENERAL CONCLUSION
This dissertation presents two studies. The first study explores a broad relevant psychology
theory, system justification theory (SJT), and whether the application of this theory in the
behavioral accounting setting can provide richer understanding of emerging complex accounting
research questions. The second study examines whether SJT’s facets, a status quo and a system
threat, affect managerial environmental disclosure decisions, a current complex managerial
accounting research question.
The first study utilizes a literature review to identify prior behavioral accounting and CSR
research that applies cognitive dissonance or social identity theory. The study reviews studies
published in the last thirty years in the accounting journals Accounting, Auditing, and
Accountability Journal, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Contemporary Accounting
Research, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Business Ethics, and The Accounting
Review. The study then explores SJT and the implications of applying this theory into behavioral
accounting and CSR research.
The results from the first study show that the commonly used and discrete theoretical
motivations – cognitive dissonance and social identity theory – limit the generalizability of prior
findings. SJT is grounded in, but also diverges from cognitive dissonance, social identity, social
dominance, and belief in a just world. Given SJT’s larger and broader theoretical perspective, its
application into complex behavioral accounting and CSR research appears warranted. Study one’s
review further suggests that applying SJT’s propositions to behavioral accounting and CSR
research can provide greater insight into complex topics that cannot be investigated through the
utilization of one, or any combination of the four foundational theories.
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The implications from study one contribute to behavioral accounting and CSR research by
demonstrating the need to incorporate more recent psychological theories that can address complex
accounting research questions. The study further highlights the need for researchers to consider
other theoretical perspectives such as SJT that could provide greater insight into emerging
complicated behavioral accounting and CSR topics.
The second study applies SJT to address one complex behavioral accounting research
question relating to managers’ propensity to disclose overstated environmental capital expenditure
(ECE) projections. Patten (2005) finds that managers tend to overstate ECE projections relative to
actual spending in the following year. SJT suggests that individuals behave consistently with social
norms (i.e., status quo) and are more likely to support the status quo in the presence of a system
threat (Jost 1995; Jost and Banaji 1994; Jost et al., 2008). Individuals believe social norms (i.e.,
status quo) are legitimate and natural (Jost and Hunyady, 2002) and maintained by individuals’
acceptance and conformity to them (Haines and Jost, 2000; Jost, 1995; Jost and Hunyady, 2002).
Therefore, the study predicts that managers will be more likely to overstate ECE projections in the
presence of an overstatement status quo. Further, in the presence of an overstatement status quo,
managers are expected to be even more likely to overstate ECE projections in the presence of a
high system threat.
Utilizing experimental methods, the second study manipulates status quo as present (the
company’s competitors overstate ECE projections relative to actual spending) or absent (only a
few of the company’s competitors overstate ECE projections relative to actual spending).
Participants were randomly placed into one of these conditions and then received one of the
following two news articles. This news article represented the second independent variable, system
threat, and was manipulated as either high (stakeholders were disappointed with companies’
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environmental activites) or low (stakeholders were indifferent with companies’ environmental
activities). Participants answered several questions relating to their ECE projection decisions.
The results of the second study show that managers overstate ECE projections more when
an overstatement status quo is present. This finding suggests that managers are more likely to
support the status quo even if doing so is against their best interest. The results also show that
managers are even more likely to overstate ECE projections when there is a high system threat.
When the overstatement status quo is threatened, managers are more likely to find the CEO’s
pressure to overstate to improve the company’s environmental legitimacy as an important factor
in their ECE disclosure decision. Managers “dig in their heels” and further support and maintain
the status quo, apparently believing that doing so is in their best interest.
The results of the second study contribute to managerial and environmental accounting
research. Cho et al. (2012) call for an in-depth and careful analysis of managers’ psychological
motivations regarding their environmental disclosure decisions. The second study addresses this
call by providing evidence of managers’ psychological and cognitive motivations driving them to
overstate and disclose ECE projections. Specifically, the results suggest that managers’
environmental disclosure decisions are impacted by the presence of a status quo and further, by a
threat to the social system. The results provide insight into why managers might use ECE
disclosures as a legitimating tool (Chen et al., 2014).
In conjunction, the two studies in this dissertation respond to a call by Cho et al. 2012 to
review broad and relevant psychological perspectives that could address emerging complex
behavioral accounting and CSR research. This dissertation provides one psychological
perspective, SJT, which is applied to one complex accounting topic relating to managers’
psychological motivations for overstating ECE projections relative to actual spending. The
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application of a broader theory, SJT, provides greater insight into understanding managers’
psychological and cognitive motivations for overstating ECE projections. Collectively, this
dissertation demonstrates the benefit of considering broader and more recent psychological
theories to address complex behavioral accounting and CSR research questions. Further, it
provides new understanding of individual decision-making.
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(H1) People will rationalize the status quo by judging likely events to be more desirable than
unlikely events, (a) even in the absence of personal responsibility, (b) whether those events are
initially defined as attractive or unattractive, and (c) especially when motivational involvement is
high rather than low.
(H2) People will use stereotypes to rationalize social and economic status differences between
groups, so that the same target group will be stereotyped differently depending on whether it is
perceived to be high or low in status.
(H3) People will defend and justify the social system in response to threat by using stereotypes to
differentiate between high- and low-status groups to a greater degree.
(H4) Providing explanations (or pseudo-explanations) for status or power differences between
groups will (a) increase the use of stereotypes to rationalize differences, and (b) lead members of
disadvantaged groups to express more positive (relative to negative) affect.
(H5) Over time, members of disadvantaged groups will misremember explanations for their
powerlessness as being more legitimate than they actually were.
(H6) Members of low-status groups will exhibit outgroup favouritism even on (a) open-ended,
non-reactive, qualitative measures, and (b) implicit, nonconscious cognitive, affective, and
behavioural measures.
(H7) As the perceived legitimacy of the system increases, (a) members of high- status groups
will exhibit increased ingroup favoritism, and (b) members of low status groups will exhibit
increased outgroup favoritism.
(H8) As system justification tendencies increase, (a) members of high-status groups will exhibit
increased ingroup favouritism, and (b) members of low-status groups will exhibit increased
outgroup favouritism.
(H9) Members of disadvantaged groups (not just women) will exhibit a depressed sense of
entitlement relative to members of advantaged groups, even in explicitly egalitarian
environments.
(H10) Members of disadvantaged groups will be more likely to exhibit depressed entitlement
(relative to members of advantaged groups) for past work that has already been completed than
for future work that has not yet been completed.
(H11) Members of low-status groups will exhibit greater ambivalence towards their own group
than will members of high-status groups.
(H12) Members of low-status groups will exhibit increased ambivalence towards their own
group as system justification is increased.
(H13) Members of high-status groups will exhibit decreased ambivalence towards their own
group as system justification is increased.
(H14) System justification will be associated with (a) increased self-esteem for members of
advantaged groups, and (b) decreased self-esteem for members of disadvantaged groups.
(H15) System justification will be associated with (a) decreased depression for members of
advantaged groups, and (b) increased depression for members of disadvantaged groups.
(H16) System justification will be associated with (a) decreased neuroticism for members of
advantaged groups, and (b) increased neuroticism for members of disadvantaged groups.
(H17) When individual and group needs and interests are low in salience or strength, members of
disadvantaged groups will provide stronger support for the social system and its authorities than
will members of advantaged groups, in so far as the former will have a stronger need than the
latter to reduce ideological dissonance through system justification.
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(H18) System justification levels will be higher in societies in which social and economic
inequality is more extreme rather than less extreme
(H19) Exposure to complementary stereotype exemplars (in which members of high and low
status groups are seen as having opposite, offsetting strengths and weaknesses) will increase
system justification, in comparison to non-complementary stereotype exemplars.
(H20) Exposure to benevolent and complementary gender stereotypes (in which women are seen
as communal but not agentic) will increase system justification, especially among women, in
comparison with neutral or non-complementary stereotypes.
Figure 1- System Justification Theory’s Propositions
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Table 1- Behavioral Accounting Research using Cognitive Dissonance Theory

Panel A: Research on Cognitive Dissonance
Theory
Accounting
Study
Journal
Area
Adams and
AAAJ
Corporate
Whelan (2009)
Social
Responsibility

Accounting Topic
Corporate social disclosure

Research Question
How can we make
changes to
organizations' CSR
disclosures
in order to enhance
accountability?

Primary Contribution
Change in CSR reporting can occur if stakeholders
create cognitive dissonance such as
threating organizations' profitability.

Can information
sharing behavior
and autonomy to select
a supplier influence a
buyer manager's trust
and investment in
management control
and collaboration?

Difficult decisions increase cognitive dissonance
and forces individuals to support
their prior decisions and beliefs. A buyer manager
with autonomy to select a supplier has greater
initial trust because it forces the manager to only
focus on the advantages of their chosen decision
while examining all the negatives of the rejected
option.

Does discretion in
information
acquisition affect
managerial
reporting?

Managers are more likely to report
opportunistically when they have discretion in
information acquisition relative to no discretion.
Managers want to maintain a positive self-image
of themselves (i.e. reduce cognitive dissonance)
and when they have discretion over information,
managers have an easier time maintaining the lie
that they are being honest and forthcoming about
their reporting.

Anderson, Chang,
Cheng, and Phua
(2017)

CAR

Management

Management control

Church, Hannan,
Kuang (2014)

CAR

Management

Opportunistic Behavior
in Reporting
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Hobson, Mayew,
Peecher, and
Venkatachalam
(2017)

JAR

Auditing

CEO Deception

Can instructions on
cognitive dissonance
improve auditors'
detection of CEO
deception?

Auditors are less likely to detect deception for
fraud companies than non-fraud companies, unless
they receive instructions about cognitive
dissonance in CEO narratives. Deceivers
experience negative affect from cognitive
dissonance and the narratives show dissonance
markers in the CEO's speech.

Hobson, Mayew,
and
Venkatachalam
(2012)

JAR

Financial

Financial Misreporting

Can vocal markers of
cognitive dissonance
aid in financial
misreporting
detection?

Vocal dissonance markets increase are associated
with the likelihood of irregularity restatements and
detecting financial misreporting. Cognitive
dissonance is described as a state of psychological
arousal and discomfort occurring when an
individual takes actions that contrast with a belief,
such as cheating while believing oneself to be
honest.
Cognitive dissonance is measured using an
automated vocal emotion analysis software.

Jermias (2001)

AOS

Management

Commitment and resistance
to change;
reduction of cognitive
dissonance

Will commitment to a
course of action cause
individuals to be
insensitive to the
benefits of alternative
approaches?

Understanding people's motivation for resist
change helps understand why new initiatives are
not implemented.
Employees resist change when they are committed
to their favored costing system and further resist
change even when receiving negative feedback as
a means to reduce cognitive dissonance.

Management

Budgetary Slack

What affects managers'
propensities to detect
and create budgetary
slack?

Managers minimize their cognitive dissonance by
reducing their propensity to create
budgetary slack when technology is available.

Merchant (1985)

AOS
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Mia (1988)

AOS

Management

Managerial Attitude

Do managerial attitude
and motivations
explain budget
participation and
performance?

Employees with a positive attitude or motivation
might develop cognitive dissonance
if their performance is below the expected
benchmark, leading them to participate more in
budgeting.

Rennekamp,
Rupar, and
Seybert (2015)

TAR

Financial

Asset Impairment and
management responsibility

Will the reversibility
of the accounting
effect of asset
impairments affect
managers' investment
decisions when they
feel responsible for
their asset impairment
decisions?

Managers who feel responsible for their decision
invest more in the impaired division when the
accounting effect of the impairment is reversible
than irreversible.
Managers who do not feel responsible for their
asset decisions do not differ in their investment in
the impaired division when an asset is reversible
of irreversible.

Thornock (2016)

AOS

Management

Performance Feedback

Can the timing of
performance feedback
impact learning and
employee
performance?

Employees experience greater cognitive
dissonance (i.e. psychological cost) when
given feedback before the implementation of an
incorrect decision because they have to proceed
with the decision choice as if it was correct and
will avoid examining alternative choices.
Employees perform better when feedback is given
immediately after the implementation of an
incorrect decision because they experience less
cognitive dissonance and effort required to accept
the incorrect decision.

Do managers
experience dissonance
from enacting the
harm-doing event and
externalize the
responsibility onto the
organization or harmdoing target?

Cognitive dissonance occurs when individuals
suffer from inconsistencies between their
cognitions and behaviors.
Individuals who perform a harm-doing event
while believing the event is unnecessary
experience cognitive dissonance. Individuals will
attribute or externalize the responsibility of the
harm-doing event onto their organization of the
target.

Panel B: CSR and Ethics Research on Cognitive Dissonance Theory
Andiappan and
Dufour (2017)

JBE

Corporate
Social
Responsibility

Dissonance Resolution
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Bodur, Duval,
and Grohmann
(2015)

JBE

Corporate
Social
Responsibility

Sustainability

Can advertisements
with a prediction
request influence
consumers' preferences
for environmentally
sustainable
products?
Why is the relationship
between supervisor
moral disengagement
and employee
perceptions of ethical
leadership?

Advertisements increase consumers' cognitive
dissonance because it threatens their prior
beliefs about the products purchased. Consumers
want to re-establish consistency and reduce
dissonance. Advertisements with a prediction
increases consumers' preference for sustainable
products while minimizing dissonance.
Unethical leaders will morally disengage and
reduce their cognitive dissonance by
rationalizing unethical behaviors.

Bonner,
Greenbaum,
and Mayer (2016)

JBE

Corporate
Social
Responsibility

Employee Behavior
and Moral Disengagement

Lamm, TostiKharas,
and King (2015)

JBE

Corporate
Social
Responsibility

Sustainability

What factors are
associated
with organizational
citizenship
behaviors toward the
environment (e.g.
voluntary
behaviors)?

Employees who experience dissonance will want
to minimize it by justifying their
private actions are in alignment with their
workplace expectations. Employees working for
an organization that values sustainability are more
likely to incorporate the same values at home and
experience greater job satisfaction.

Thomas and
Lamm (2012)

JBE

Corporate
Social
Responsibility

Sustainability

Is there a conceptual
model to inform
readers about the
legitimacy of
sustainability?

Builds a theoretical model of three types of
attitudes and norms

How do investors and
analysts evaluate the
usefulness of fair
values?

Does not reference cognitive dissonance theory
Users and standard setters evaluating fair values
disagree about what information counts,
increasing dissonance.
Users and standard setters hold different
perceptions about how to define and evaluate what
is value-relevant, leading to differing evaluations
of fair values.

Panel C: Research Indirectly using or applying Cognitive Dissonance
Theory
Georgiou (2018)
CAR
Financial
Fair Value Accounting
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Hope and Wang
(2018)

AOS

Management

Management Ethics

Can managers'
truthfulness or
deceptiveness
influence how
investors perceive big
baths (i.e. negative
discretionary
accruals, one-time
large write-offs, asset
impairments)?

Information asymmetry is significantly higher
when deceptive CEOs relative to less deceptive
CEOs take big baths.
Applying a prior study's application of cognitive
dissonance, investors are more likely to spot
dissonance in CEOs remarks.

Rennekamp,
Rupar,
and Seybert
(2018)

SSRN

Management

Managerial Deception

Can unconscious
thinking enabled by a
decision tool
improve individuals'
deception detection of
management lies?

Individuals are more likely to detect fraud when
they experience a deceptive act than when no
deceptive act occurs.

*The literature search for cognitive dissoanance theory was carried out manually by searching through the following journals:
Accounting, Auditing , and Accountability Journal. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Contemporary Accounting Research,
Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Business Ethics, and The Accounting Review. A manual search on Science Direct was
then followed up to ensure all relevant articles were included in this review. This literature review encompassed any research that
contained, applied, or reference cognitive dissoanance theory in 1988 to 2018.
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Table 2 –Behavioral Accounting Research using Social Identity Theory

Panel A: Research on Social Identity Theory
Accounting
Study
Journal
Area
AndersonAOS
Accounting
Gough, Grey,
and Robson
(2001)

Accounting Topic
Professional Identity

Research Question
Can socialization of trainees
into groups of timeconsciousness and temporal
visioning build professional
identity?

Primary Contribution
Accounting firms' practices and timeorientation promote organization identity.
(time-consciousness, temporal visioning, and
politics of time)
Organizational socialization develops
employee professional identity.

Bauer (2015)

TAR

Auditing

Professional Identity

Can improving an auditor's
professional identity promote
auditor independence?

Professional identity can improve short-term
auditor independence.
Auditors with a stronger client identity agree
more with the client and assess a higher
likelihood that the client's business will
continue to run. This likelihood is reduced,
however, when professional identity is
improved.

Cohen, Gaynor,
Krishnamoorthy
,
and Wright
(2017)

Working
paper

Auditing

Audit Committee
Ties

Do social and professional
ties
affect perceptions of audit
committee competence and
effectiveness?

Professional or social ties and industry
expertise affect assessments of audit
committee independence and competence.
Investors assess audit committees with no ties
and industry expertise (social ties and no
industry expertise) as the most (least)
effective and competent, resulting in the
highest (lowest) likelihood of investing.
Investors assess high committee independence
when there are professional ties than social
ties.
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Free and
Murphy (2015)

CAR

Auditing

Social Ties

Do social ties promote
individuals
to co-offend in fraud?

Social bonds and ties between agents makes a
fraud a potential opportunity. These social
bonds are described as three archetypes:
individual serving functional bonds,
organization-serving functional bond, and
affective bonds.

He, Pittman,
Rui,
and Wu (2017)

TAR

Auditing

Social Ties

Do social ties between
engagement auditors and the
audit committee affect audit
outcomes?

Social ties between engagement auditors and
audit committee members impair audit quality
and increase audit fees

Heinle,
Hofmann,
and Kunz (2012)

TAR

Managerial

Organizational
identity

How does organizational
identity impact organizational
standards, incentives, and
performance-measure
characteristics?

Managers who identify with their
organization receive stronger incentives and
greater performance evaluation reports. These
managers can also reduce their effort in the
short-term.

Iyer, Mbamber,
and
Barefield (1997)

AOS

Accounting

Alumni Identity

Can individuals'
identification
with a former accounting
firm impact firm value?

Alumni identification with a former
accounting firm impacts the likelihood of an
alum sending the former firm business.
Accounting policies while the alum is
currently associated with the firm impacts
their alumni identification with the firm.

Rose, Rose,
Norman,
and Mazza
(2014)

TAR

Financial

Friendship Ties

Will directors who have
friendship ties with the CEO
manage earnings to benefit
the CEO in the short term
while potentially sacrificing
the welfare of the company in
the long term?
Will public disclosure of
friendship ties mitigate or
exacerbate such behavior,
and influence investors’
perceptions of director
decisions?

Directors with friendship ties with the CEO
were more likely to approve reductions to
research and development expenses, causing
earnings to rise enough to meet CEO's
minimum bonus target more than when there
are no friendship ties.
Disclosing friendship ties resulted in even
greater reductions in R&D expenses and
higher CEO bonuses than not disclosing
friendship ties. Shareholders were more
likely to agree with directors’ decisions to
approve cuts to R&D when friendship ties
were disclosed.
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Towry (2003)

TAR

Managerial

Social Ties and
Team Identity

Can the level of team identity
impact the effectiveness of
different incentive systems?
(i.e. vertical vs. horizontal)

A strong team identity improves coordination.
However, a vertical incentive system's
effectiveness is reduced when there is strong
team identity.
Organizations should use horizontal incentive
systems when there is a strong team identity.

Panel B: CSR and Ethics Research on Social
Identity Theory
He and Li
JBE
Corporate
(2011)
Social
Responsibility

Brand Identification

Can service quality and CSR
engagement impact brand
identification?

CSR and service quality impact how well
individuals identify with a brand and
customer satisfactions. The more an
organization engages in CSR and service
quality, the more likely customers are to
identify with that specific product.

Hoitash (2011)

JBE

Corporate
Social
Responsibility

Social Ties

Do social ties affect the
strength of a company's
internal control and executive
compensation?

Companies that have board member ties to
management exhibit lower likelihood of
material weaknesses in internal controls and
financial restatements. Social ties between
management and independent board members
are associated with higher management
compensation and therefore directors should
disqualify themselves from serving on
compensation committees.

Kaplan,
Samuels,
Cohen (2015)

JBE

Corporate
Social
Responsibility

Social Ties

Do CEO social ties affect
nonprofessional investors'
pay judgment decisions?

Marin and Ruiz
(2007)

JBE

Corporate
Social
Responsibility

Organizational
Identity

What factors are associated
with an organization's
identity that make it
appealing to individuals?

CEO's social ties to members of the executive
compensation committee favorably impacts
how the CEO is compensated but investors
are less likely to resolve any compensation
issues unless the CEO has a positive
reputation.
Corporate social responsibility contributions
increase an organization's identity
attractiveness to consumers.

Marin, Ruiz,
Rubio (2009)

JBE

Corporate
Social
Responsibility

Organizational
Identity

Do stakeholders reward
organizations that have
adopted CSR practices?
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Consumers are more likely to identify and be
loyal to organizations that engage in
CSR initiatives.

Turker (2009)

JBE

Corporate
Social
Responsibility

Panel C: Research Indirectly using or
applying Social Identity Theory
Bills, Hayne,
TAR
Auditing
and Stein (2018)

Libby,
Rennekamp,
and Seybert
(2015)

AOS

Financial

Organizational
Identity

Does CSR impact employee's
organizational commitment
and identity?

Employees' commitment to an organization
increases when organizations are
socially responsible. The prestige of an
organization impacts the self-esteem and
identity of the employees.

Firm Membership

Does firm association affect
audit quality?

Firms improve their social and firm
membership, a critical component affecting a
firms' audit quality

Social Identity

What is the relationship
between
the roles of managers,
auditors, and directors in
earnings management and
decision-making?

Using Bauer (2015), auditors can develop
strong relationships with new clients after a
short tenue, reducing the effectiveness of
rotation for enhancing independence.

*The literature search for social identity theory was carried out manually by searching through the following journals: Accounting,
Auditing , and Accountability Journal. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Contemporary Accounting Research, Journal of
Accounting Research, Journal of Business Ethics, and The Accounting Review. A manual search on Science Direct was then
followed up to ensure all relevant articles were included in this review. This literature review encompassed any research that
contained, applied, or reference social identity theory in 1988 to 2018.

87

APPENDIX C: STUDY 2 EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS

88

You are being invited to take part in a research study. Whether you take part is up to you.
•

The purpose of this research is to understand how managers respond to different social
situations. This will help firms understand corporate and social culture.
• Thank you for agreeing to participate in our research. Before you begin, please note that
the data you provide may be collected and used by Amazon as per its privacy agreement.
This agreement shall be interpreted according to United States law.
• Participants are students recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. During the study,
participants will assume the role of a manager in a hypothetical company. Participants are
randomly assigned to different social situations, decide the amount of expenditures they
want to project, and answer some questions about the study and themselves. All
responses will be completely anonymous.
• The study will take approximately 20-30 minutes to complete.
• Participants who successfully pass the screening questions will then be able to participate
in the study. All participants will be compensated $2.00 if they successfully complete the
survey.
You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.
Study contact for questions about the study or to report a problem: If you have questions,
concerns, or complaints please contact Wioleta Olczak, Graduate Student, Kenneth Dixon School
of Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407)-823-2963, Wioleta.Olczak@ucf.edu.
IRB contact about your rights in the study or to report a complaint:
Research at the
University of Central Florida involving human participants is carried out under the oversight of
the Institutional Review Board (UCF IRB). This research has been reviewed and approved by the
IRB. For information about the rights of people who take part in research, please contact:
Institutional Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office of Research &
Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone
at (407) 823-2901.
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Please answer the following questions about yourself.
1. Are you currently or have you been a manager with the authority to make decisions about the
operation of your department, division etc.?
a. Yes
b. No
2. Does your current or past organization have a designated individual or group of individuals
who are responsible for managing the company’s environmental/sustainability performance?
a. Yes
b. No
3. To what degree do you have an influence on the actions of this person or group?
____________________________________________________________________________
0% influence
100% influence
4. To what degree have you had an influence on a similar person or group in your previous
jobs?
____________________________________________________________________________
0% influence
100% influence
5. Does your current or past organization have a designated individual or group of individuals
who are responsible for managing the company’s environmental forecasts, spending, or
performance?
a. Yes
b. No
6. To what degree do you have an influence on the actions of this person or group?
____________________________________________________________________________
0% influence
100% influence
7. To what degree have you had an influence on a similar person or group in your previous
jobs?
________________________________________________________________________
0% influence
100% influence
8. Please rate the extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: I feel comfortable
evaluating a company’s financial or environmental performance by analyzing its annual
reports and 10K reports.
|
1
Strongly
Disagree

|
2
Disagree

|
|
3
4
Somewhat Neither agree
Disagree or disagree
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|
5
Somewhat
Agree

|
6
Agree

|
7
Strongly
Agree

The next screen will provide you with an overview of the case. Please read the overview
carefully as you will be asked several comprehension check questions after reading the case
details. These questions are designed to ensure you fully understand the facts of this case
before you make any decisions using this information.
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CASE OVERVIEW
Your Role
You are starting a new job as the Chief Sustainability Officer (CSO) of ABC Company, an
American multinational energy company. The job of the CSO is to work with the CEO to
improve and align the company’s sustainable performance with its core objectives. This will be
your first year at ABC Company. You report directly to the CEO.
Your Task
It is now the end of 2018 and you will use the information provided below to decide what ABC
Company should disclose in its Annual Report and 10K about its projected 2019 environmental
capital spending. A Form 10-K is an annual report required by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) that gives a comprehensive summary of a company's financial performance.
This report is publicly available for download and is read by shareholders and potential
shareholders. ABC Company and its competitors are all required to disclose projected
environmental capital spending for the following year in their current year 10K report.
ABC Company Summary
ABC Company specializes in producing and distributing different types of energy products
including oil, natural gas, solar, and wind power. ABC Co. markets and distributes products
throughout the world. ABC Co. has significant operations in North and South America,
Australia, and Asia. It is ranked as the 5th largest energy producer in the world.
Strong competition exists in all sectors of the energy industry. ABC Co. competes with other
petroleum and energy companies that specialize in the acquisition, refining and distribution of
crude oil and natural gas. ABC Co. competes against these companies by continuously
enhancing its products, marketing these products to distributors and end-consumers, and
engaging in environmental and sustainability projects.
In 2017, ABC Company projected that it would spend $700 million on environmental projects.
Its actual environmental spending in 2017 was actually $320 million, an overstatement of 55%.
ABC Company’s new Environmental Project for 2018
In 2018, ABC Company has decided to invest in a new sustainability project that will help
reduce greenhouse gas pollution and toxic emissions involved in the extraction and refining of
oil and natural gas. The technology involved in this project is highly innovative and therefore, it
is difficult to project its cost accurately.
Given the project cost’s uncertainty, your team has provided you with a range estimate for
projected 2019 environmental capital spending. The team concluded that actual spending could
range from $600 million to $1 billion.
Your Performance Evaluation
The Compensation Committee of ABC Company’s Board of Directors is responsible for
designing compensation contracts for top managers (including for you, the CSO) at ABC
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Company as well as for setting goals and targets and for evaluating performance of top managers
each year. As part of this responsibility, the Compensation Committee has specified that
substantial weight in your annual performance evaluation will be placed on the accuracy of the
forecasted cost of capital projects compared with actual spending in 2019. Your projections for
2019 will go to the Board and will be disclosed in the 10K for the 2018 fiscal year. Next year, in
2019, when the project is complete, the actual amount of environmental capital spending will be
known, and the Board will evaluate the accuracy of your projections for 2019. In other words,
accuracy in projecting 2019 environmental capital spending relative to actual amounts will have
a positive impact on your 2019 performance evaluation. The Board will evaluate you as a high
performer if you are accurate in projecting 2019 environmental capital expenditures relative to
actual environmental capital expenditures spent by ABC Company.
Your CEO’s Expectations and Your 2019 Environmental Capital Spending Projection
Over the past year, the CEO has continuously discussed the importance of ABC Company’s
environmental and sustainability performance. At a recent meeting of top managers of ABC
Company, the CEO emphasized that it is essential that ABC Company matches, if not, exceeds
their competitors’ environmental capital spending as disclosed publicly in their 10K reports. He
believes that keeping up with the competition in this area will improve ABC Company’s
environmental image and maintain its environmental and sustainable legitimacy. The CEO
believes that by projecting higher future environmental capital spending, ABC Company will be
more appealing to current and future shareholders. Although the CEO knows that your annual
performance evaluation by the Board is based on the accuracy of your projections relative to
actual capital spending, the CEO urges you to make a projection closer to $1 billion in
environmental capital spending. He sees this as important to the company’s reputation with
current and future shareholders as a legitimate environmentally-focused organization.
Quiz
1. Based on your team’s evaluation, what is the range of possible environmental capital
spending in 2019?
a. $450 million to $500 million
b. $600 million to $1 billion
c. $700 million to $900 million
d. $800 million to $950 million
2. Does the Board of Directors weight your annual performance on your accuracy in projecting
2019 environmental capital expenditures relative to actual environmental capital
expenditures in 2019?
a. Yes
b. No
3. According to your CEO, your capital spending projections should be on your team’s
a. $600 million
b. $1 billion
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Present Status Quo Condition:
Before deciding what cost to disclose, you have asked your team to investigate the projections of
environmental capital spending in the 2017 10K reports of ABC Company’s most direct industry
competitors relative to the actual amounts of these expenditures disclosed in their 2018 Annual
Reports. Your team has summarized this information in the table below.
These competitors all resemble ABC Company in terms of size, age, and have similar patterns of
revenue growth over the last 5 years.

Company Name

Competitor A
Competitor B
Competitor C
Competitor D

Projected
Environmental
Capital Spending for
2017
(1)
$1000 million
$940 million
$850 million
$950 million

Actual
Environmental
Capital Spending in
2017
(2)
$795 million
$705 million
$680 million
$780 million

Accuracy of
Projection

[(2-1)/1]
Overstated by 21%
Overstated by 25%
Overstated by 20%
Overstated by 18%

It appears that overstating projected environmental capital spending relative to actual
environmental capital spending is common in your industry.

94

Absent Status Quo Condition:
Before deciding what cost to disclose, you have asked your team to investigate the projections of
environmental capital spending in the 2017 10K reports of ABC Company’s most direct industry
competitors relative to the actual amounts of these expenditures disclosed in their 2018 Annual
Reports. Your team has summarized this information in the table below.
These competitors all resemble ABC Company in terms of size, age, and have similar patterns of
revenue growth over the last 5 years.

Company Name

A
B
C
D

Projected
Environmental
Capital Spending for
2017
(1)
$500 million
$940 million
$611 million
$600 million

Actual
Environmental
Capital Spending for
2017
(2)
$654 million
$633 million
$781 million
$750 million

Accuracy of
Projection

[(2-1)/1]
Understated by 31%
Overstated by 33%
Understated by 28%
Understated by 25%

It appears that overstating projected environmental capital spending relative to actual
environmental capital spending is not common in your industry.

95

As you are about to decide what ABC Company’s 2019 projected environmental capital
spending should be disclosed in the 10K report should be, you receive the following email from
the CEO.
[High System Threat]
To: Members of the Top Management Team
From: Chief Executive Officer
Subject: Interesting article
This article just came through the Oil and Gas News feed. I’m passing it on to you since it has
implications for our current environmental and sustainability strategy
What Stakeholders Think About U.S. Oil and Gas Companies and their Environmental
Performance
A recent survey of US citizens over 18 years old conducted by researchers at a prestigious
university examines how stakeholders perceive large public companies’ environmental
performance. The study finds that 90% percent of respondents are extremely concerned with
major public companies’ environmental performance. In fact, a majority of these respondents
said they are thoroughly displeased with companies’ apparent lack of environmental concern. A
majority of respondents indicate that major U.S. public companies currently show a lack of
respect for the environment. In addition, 85% of respondents believe that major U.S. public
companies currently prioritize profits over protecting the environment. When asked what they
would like to see from U.S. companies in the future, 95% say they want U.S. companies to invest
more in environmental and sustainability projects.
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[Low System Threat]
To: Members of the Top Management Team
From: Chief Executive Officer
Subject: Interesting article
This article just came through on the Oil and Gas News feed. I’m passing it on to you since it has
implications for our current environmental and sustainability strategy
What Stakeholders Think About U.S. Oil and Gas Companies and their Environmental
Performance
A recent survey of US citizens over 18 years old conducted by researchers at a prestigious
university examines how stakeholders perceive large public companies’ environmental
performance. The study finds that 90% percent of respondents are not concerned with major
public companies’ environmental performance. In fact, a majority of these respondents said they
are indifferent to companies’ apparent lack of environmental concern. A majority of respondents
indicate that major U.S. public companies currently show at least some respect for the
environment. An additional 85% of stakeholders believe that major U.S. companies currently
prioritize both profits and their impact on the environment or society. When asked what they
would like to see from U.S. companies in the future, 95% say they want U.S. companies to
continue to invest at the current rate in environmental and sustainability projects.
.
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Based on the information above, please answer the following questions. Please note that the
following are not review questions.
1. Are you going to project high environmental capital expenditures for the following year?
a. Yes
b. No
2. What is the likelihood you will project high environmental capital expenditures?
____________________________________________________________________
0%
100%
3. I believe ABC Company should project high environmental capital expenditures for the
following year?
|
1
Strongly
Disagree

|
2
Disagree

|
|
3
4
Somewhat Neither agree
Disagree or disagree
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|
5
Somewhat
Agree

|
6
Agree

|
7
Strongly
Agree

You are now ready to make your projection of ABC Company’s 2019 environmental capital
spending.
Please slide the bar below to indicate the estimate of ABC Company’s 2019 environmental
capital spending that you recommend be disclosed in the company’s 10K.

$600 million

$1 billion

$______
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Post Experimental Questionnaire:
Please answer the following questions using the scale to determine how much you agree or
disagree with each of the following statements based on the information you read in the case:
1.

All of ABC Company’s main competitors overstated their environmental capital
projections in their 10K reports relative to their actual spending on these projects in the
following year.

|
1
Strongly
Disagree

|
2
Disagree

|
3
Somewhat
Disagree

|
4
Neither
Agree or
Disagree

|
5
Somewhat
Agree

|
6
Agree

|
7
Strongly
Agree

2. According to the news article provided by the CEO, survey respondents demand more
investment in environmental projects by companies in the oil and gas industry.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly
Disagree
Somewhat
Neither
Somewhat
Agree
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Agree or
Agree
Agree
Disagree
3. The weight that the Board will place on the accuracy of projections in my performance
evaluation was an important factor in developing my environmental capital expenditure
projection.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly
Disagree
Somewhat
Neither
Somewhat
Agree
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Agree or
Agree
Agree
Disagree
4. The CEO’s interest in improving ABC Company’s environmental legitimacy with current
and future shareholders was an important factor in my environmental capital spending
projection.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly
Disagree
Somewhat
Neither
Somewhat
Agree
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Agree or
Agree
Agree
Disagree
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5. Projecting higher environmental capital expenditures to satisfy my CEO was in my best
interest.
|
1
Strongly
Disagree

|
2
Disagree

|
3
Somewhat
Disagree

|
4
Neither
Agree or
Disagree

|
5
Somewhat
Agree

|
6
Agree

|
7
Strongly
Agree

6. Projecting lower environmental capital expenditures to satisfy the Board of Directors was
in my best interest.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly
Disagree
Somewhat
Neither
Somewhat
Agree
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Agree or
Agree
Agree
Disagree
7. My best interest is to:

Receive a good performance evaluation from the Board

Follow CEO instructions

8. I estimated higher environmental projections than actual spending to cover any additional
expenses that might come as a surprise.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly
Disagree
Somewhat
Neither
Somewhat
Agree
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Agree or
Agree
Agree
Disagree
9. Overstating projected environmental spending relative to actual environmental capital
spending hurt my annual performance evaluation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly
Disagree
Somewhat
Neither
Somewhat
Agree
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Agree or
Agree
Agree
Disagree
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1. I feel uncomfortable with my environmental capital expenditure projection.
|
1
Very
Slightly

|
2

|
3

|
4

|
5
Quite A
Bit

2. I feel uneasy with my environmental capital expenditure projection.
|
1
Very
Slightly

|
2

|
3

|
4

|
5
Quite A
Bit

3. I feel bothered about my environmental capital expenditure projection.
|
1
Very
Slightly

|
2

|
3
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|
4

|
5
Quite A
Bit

1. It feels personal if others criticize or compliment ABC Company.
|
1
Strongly
Disagree

|
2
Disagree

|
3
Somewhat
Disagree

|
4
Neither
Agree or
Disagree

|
5
Somewhat
Agree

|
6
Agree

|
7
Strongly
Agree

2. I believe that individuals get what they deserve and deserve what they get.
|
1
Strongly
Disagree

3.

|
2
Disagree

|
3
Somewhat
Disagree

|
4
Neither
Agree or
Disagree

|
5
Somewhat
Agree

|
6
Agree

|
7
Strongly
Agree

|
6
Agree

|
7
Strongly
Agree

I believe the CEO should have influence over managers’ decisions.

|
1
Strongly
Disagree

|
2
Disagree

|
3
Somewhat
Disagree

|
4
Neither
Agree or
Disagree
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|
5
Somewhat
Agree

DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS

1. How old are you?
____________

2. What is your gender?
a. Male
b. Female

3. Which ethnic group do you consider yourself? (Check only one)
_____African/African American
_____Asian/Pacific Islander
_____Caucasian/White (non-Hispanic)
_____Hispanic
_____Middle Eastern/Arabic
_____Multi-Racial
_____Native American
_____Other
_____Prefer not to answer

4. Approximately how many years of full-time work experience do you have?
___________
5. How many years have you worked in your current job?

6. Do you make decisions about investing in new capital projects?
a. Yes
b. No
___________

7.

What is your political orientation?
|
1
Extremely
Liberal

|
2
Liberal

|
3
Slightly
Liberal

|
4
Middle or
Neither
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|
|
|
5
6
7
Slightly
Conservative Extremely
Conservative
Conservative

8. Being an American is an important determinant of how I feel about myself.
|
1
Strongly
Disagree

|
|
|
|
4
5
6
7
Neither
Somewhat
Agree
Strongly
Agree or
Agree
Agree
Disagree
9. Environmental sustainability issues are so important that I would incorporate them into dayto-day business decision-making if I were a corporate executive.
|
1
Strongly
Disagree

|
2
Disagree

|
2
Disagree

|
3
Somewhat
Disagree

|
|
3
4
Somewhat Neither agree
Disagree or disagree

|
5
Somewhat
Agree

|
6
Agree

|
7
Strongly
Agree

10. I support including environmental sustainability concerns into business decisions despite the
possible additional cost involved.
|
1
Strongly
Disagree

|
2
Disagree

|
|
3
4
Somewhat Neither agree
Disagree or disagree
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|
5
Somewhat
Agree

|
6
Agree

|
7
Strongly
Agree
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0.70
p = 0.02
t = 2.35

Alignment of
Interest

Status Quo
(Present vs. Absent)

32.02
p <0.001
t = 7.69

ECE
9.31
p= 0.56
t = 0.58

This figure shows the bias-corrected bootstrap mediation results linking STATUS QUO
(PRESENT versus ABSENT), Alignment of Interest, and ECE, using macros for SPSS (model 4)
described in (Preacher and Hayes, 2008). The mediation analysis shows that there is a significant
relationship between STATUS QUO and Alignment of Interest (t = 2.35; p = 0.02) and Alignment
of Interest and ECE (t = 32.02; p<0.001). The direct effect of STATUS QUO on ECE is no longer
significant when including the mediator (t= 0.58; p= 0.56). The 99% bootstrap confidence
suggest that mediation has occurred as the indirect effect path of STATUS QUO on ECE through
Alignment of Interest is significant since it does not include zero (Effect = 22.54; Boot SE =
10.01; CI[4.56, 43.67]). The results utilizing OVERSTATE present similar findings to Figure 1
above.
Figure 2– Mediation Analyses for STATUS QUO – PRESENT versus ABSENT
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Importance
of CEO
Interest

0.61
p< 0.001
t = 9.76

Alignment
of Interest
24.37
p<0.001

0.95
p< 0.001
t = 3.88

System Threat
(HIGH vs.
LOW)

t = 4.19
10.03
p= 0.05
t = 1.96

0.56
p= 0.009
t = 2.62

ECE
19.48
p= 0.12
t = 1.55

This figure shows the bias-corrected bootstrap mediation results linking THREAT (HIGH versus
LOW), Importance of CEO Interest, Alignment of Interest, and ECE, using macros for SPSS
(model 6) described in (Preacher and Hayes, 2008). The mediation analysis shows that there is a
significant relationship between THREAT and Importance of CEO Interest (t = 3.88; p<0.001)
and THREAT and Alignment of Interest (t = 0.56; p = 0.0009). The model also show a direct
effect of Importance of CEO Interest on Alignment of Interest (t = 9.76; p <0.001), Importance of
CEO Interest on ECE (t = 1.96; p = 0.05), and Alignment of Interest on ECE (t = 4.19; p<0.001).
The direct effect of THREAT on ECE is no longer significant when including the two mediators:
Alignment of Interest and Importance of CEO Interest (t= 1.55; p= 0.12), suggesting that the
effect of THREAT on ECE is fully mediated through Importance of CEO Interest and Alignment
of Interest. The 99% bootstrap confidence suggest that mediation has occurred as the indirect
effect of THREAT on ECE through Importance of CEO Interest is significant since it does not
include zero (Effect = 9.50; Boot SE = 5.33; CI[1.43, 23.22]). It also suggests mediation has
occurred as the indirect effect of THREAT on ECE through Alignment of Interest is significant
and does not include zero (Effect = 13.69; Boot SE = 6.15; CI [3.59, 27.82]). Most importantly,
Figure 2 suggests that a full mediation has occurred as the indirect effect of THREAT on ECE
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through Importance of CEO Interest and then through Alignment of Interest is significant and
does not include zero (Effect = 14.13; Boot SE = 5.22; CI[6.27, 27.57]).
Figure 3– Mediation Analyses for THREAT – HIGH versus LOW
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Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: OVERSTATE
System Threat
Low
High
Status Quo- Absent
Proportion
Percent
Status Quo- Present
Proportion
Percent
Panel B: ECE

32 out of 64
50.0%
43 out of 65
59 out of 63
66.2%
93.7%
System Threat
Low
High

Status Quo- Absent
Mean
Std. Dev
Median
No. of Observations
Status Quo- Present
Mean
Std. Dev
Median
No. of Observations

$823.02
97.52
$803.50
64
$854.86
104.29
$850
65

$895.86
79.79
$908
63

Panel C: Process Measures Means (standard deviation) [median]
Alignment of Interest
Importance of CEO Interest
System Threat
System Threat
Low
High
Low
High
Status Quo-Absent
4.25
Status Quo-Absent
4.61
(1.67)
(1.66)
[4]
[5]
Status Quo-Present

4.95
(1.70)
[5]

5.75
(1.43)
[6]
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Status Quo-Present

4.98
1.62
[5]

5.75
1.54
[6]

Variable Definitions:
Absent = where participants are not aware of their industry's environmental projection relative to
actual spending pattern
Present = where participants are aware that their industry overstates environmental projections
relative to actual spending
Low = participants in the low system threat receive an article regarding stakeholders'
indifference to the oil and gas industry's environmental performance
High = participants in the high system threat receive an article regarding stakeholders'
dissatisfaction to the oil and gas industry's environmental performance
Overstate = participants' responses as to whether (Yes/No) they will project high environmental
projections. The above shows the number of "yes" responses.
ECE= participants’ environmental projection using a slider scale with $600 million and $1
billion as endpoints
Alignment of Interest = participants’ response to the following question: “Projecting higher
environmental capital expenditures to satisfy my CEO was in my best interest” on a 7 point
Likert scale with “Strongly Agree” and “Strongly Disagree” endpoints.
Importance of CEO Interest = participants responses to the following question: “The CEO’s
interest in improving ABC Company’s environmental legitimacy with current and future
shareholders was an important factor in my environmental capital spending projection” on a 7
point Likert scale with “Strongly Agree” and “Strongly Disagree” endpoints
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Table 4 - Experimental Results - H1
Panel A: Chi Square Test for H1 (OVERSTATE)
Present/Low vs. Present/High
Stat.
p
PhiValue
Phi Sig.
2
OVERSTATE
χ(1) = 29.31
0.001
0.39
0.001
Panel B: Test of H1- Independent t-test of ECE projections
Source
DF
t
p-value (one-tailed)
Status Quo
Present versus Absent
127 -1.79
0.04
Variable Definitions:
Absent = where participants are not aware of their industry's environmental projection relative
to actual spending pattern
Present = where participants are aware that their industry overstates environmental projections
relative to actual spending
Low = participants in the low system threat receive an article regarding stakeholders'
indifference to the oil and gas industry's environmental performance
High = participants in the high system threat receive an article regarding stakeholders'
dissatisfaction to the oil and gas industry's environmental performance
Overstate = participants' responses as to whether (Yes/No) they will project high
environmental projections.
ECE= participants’ environmental projection using a slider scale with $600 million and $1
billion as endpoints
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Table 5 - Experimental Results - H2
Independent t-test of Status Quo: PRESENT versus ABSENT
DF
t
F
p-value (one-tailed)
Alignment of Interest
127
-2.37
0.15
0.01
Importance of CEO Interest
127
-1.30
0.31
0.10
Variable Definitions:
Absent = where participants are not aware of their industry's environmental projection relative to
actual spending pattern
Present = where participants are aware that their industry overstates environmental projections
relative to actual spending
Alignment of Interest = participants’ response to the following question: “Projecting higher
environmental capital expenditures to satisfy my CEO was in my best interest” on a 7 point
Likert scale with “Strongly Agree” and “Strongly Disagree” endpoints.
Importance of CEO Interest = participants responses to the following question: “The CEO’s
interest in improving ABC Company’s environmental legitimacy with current and future
shareholders was an important factor in my environmental capital spending projection” on a 7
point Likert scale with “Strongly Agree” and “Strongly Disagree” endpoints.
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Table 6 - Experimental Results - H3
Panel A: Chi Square Test for H3

OVERSTATE

Present/Low vs. Present/High
Stat.
p
PhiValue
Phi Sig.
2
χ(1) = 29.78
0.001
0.48
0.001

Panel B: Test of H3- Independent t-test of ECE projections
Source
DF
t
p-value (one-tailed)
System Threat
High versus Low
122.58 -2.61
0.005
Variable Definitions:
Present = where participants are aware that their industry overstates environmental projections
relative to actual spending
Low = participants in the low system threat receive an article regarding stakeholders'
indifference to the oil and gas industry's environmental performance
High = participants in the high system threat receive an article regarding stakeholders'
dissatisfaction to the oil and gas industry's environmental performance
Overstate = participants' responses as to whether (Yes/No) they will project high environmental
projections.
ECE= participants’ environmental projection using a slider scale with $600 million and $1
billion as endpoints
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Table 7 - Experimental Results - H4
Independent t-test of System Threat: HIGH versus LOW
DF
t
F
Alignment of Interest
123.47
-2.86
2.95
Importance of CEO Interest
126.00
-2.72
0.60

p-value (one-tailed)
0.003
0.004

Variable Definitions:
Low = participants in the low system threat receive an article regarding stakeholders'
indifference to the oil and gas industry's environmental performance
High = participants in the high system threat receive an article regarding stakeholders'
dissatisfaction to the oil and gas industry's environmental performance
Alignment of Interest = participants’ response to the following question: “Projecting higher
environmental capital expenditures to satisfy my CEO was in my best interest” on a 7 point
Likert scale with “Strongly Agree” and “Strongly Disagree” endpoints.
Importance of CEO Interest = participants responses to the following question: “The CEO’s
interest in improving ABC Company’s environmental legitimacy with current and future
shareholders was an important factor in my environmental capital spending projection” on a 7
point Likert scale with “Strongly Agree” and “Strongly Disagree” endpoints.

116

APPENDIX F: IRB APPROVAL

117

118

